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ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS: DOCTRINE AND
POLICY IN THE WAKE OF GILMER
Joseph R. Grodin*

Voluntary arbitration must be voluntary in a real and genuine sense.
There can be little concern that it is genuinely voluntary, when
arbitration is agreed upon in collective bargaining between unions and
employers possessing an equality, more or less, of bargaining power.
The same is true of commercial arbitrations between business concerns
which enter into arbitration agreements knowingly and advisedly. The
situation may be different however, where an arbitration clause appears
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as "boiler plate" in... [a] document where bargaining power may be

unequal.!
I.

SUMMARY

The Supreme Court's receptivity to the arbitration of statutory
claims, combined with its preemptive reading of the Federal Arbitration
Act, has created the potential for wholesale diversion of employmentrelated disputes, including federal and state employment discrimination
claims, from litigation to arbitration through agreements drafted by
employers and imposed upon employees as a condition of employment.
In the author's view, such a development threatens the effective
implementation of anti-discrimination policy, and poses serious questions
of fairness to individual claimants. While such problems are particularly
acute when an employer crafts an arbitration agreement with a view
toward gaining a procedural or substantive advantage, even "neutral"
arbitration procedures are more likely to operate to the institutional
advantage of employers.
The first part of this article sets forth the developments which have
led to the current state of affairs, and then uses a hypothetical problem
to examine various doctrines which may serve to limit the wholesale
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the employment
context. These doctrines include the Federal Arbitration Act's exemption
for certain "contracts of employment"; common law doctrines of fraud,
duress, and unconscionability; and the policies implicit in the various
federal anti-discrimination statutes. While this examination reveals
considerable uncertainty in current law, it also concludes that doctrine is
available to control the unilateral imposition of arbitration procedures
upon unwilling employees.
In the second part of this article, the author addresses in broader
public policy terms the alternatives of policing agreements to arbitrate
statutory employment claims for fairness and for voluntariness. While a
program of policing for fairness is clearly preferable to doing nothing, it
is difficult to implement and unlikely to resolve in a satisfactory way the
problems of fairness and public policy posed by adhesive agreements to
arbitrate. In the author's view, it would be preferable either to deny
altogether the enforcement of pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
discrimination claims, or to insist that any waiver of a judicial forum be
1. Arthur J. Goldberg, A Supreme Court Justice Looks At Arbitration (Mar. 17, 1965), in 20
ARB. J. 13, 16 (1965) (addressing the American Arbitration Association on Arbitration Day).
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knowing and voluntary. The author explores how an insistence that
waiver be knowing and voluntary might be implemented, either on an
individual basis or on a group basis through secret ballot elections. While
conceding that the optimal solution may require legislation, the author
concludes that there are a number of things that courts can and should do
within existing doctrine to further statutory policy.
I1. A HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM
Georgeanne Phillips, forty-six, has been employed as a secretary in
various companies since she graduated from high school. For the past
two years she was employed by Hazard Insurance Company, but four
months ago she was fired, allegedly for repeated tardiness in reporting
for work. Georgeanne believes she was really fired because she
complained to management about being sexually harassed by her
supervisor, which had been going on for more than a year. She believes
that company records would show that other employees with similar
records of tardiness were not similarly disciplined. She also believes that
the same supervisor has been harassing other female employees, who are
too frightened to speak out.
A lawyer might advise Georgeanne that if the facts pan out, she has
a good basis for claims under federal and state anti-discrimination laws,
both for the ongoing harassment and for the termination itself. If her
claims succeed, she stands to recover substantial monetary damages-especially under her state's anti-discrimination law, which (unlike
Title VII) does not limit the amounts of compensatory and punitive
damages available in private actions.2 Thus, an attorney would most
likely be willing to take her case for a contingency fee.
But there is a problem. When Georgeanne applied for the position
at Hazard, she was informed that the company required all employees to
sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of employment, and she did
so. The agreement provides for binding arbitration of "all disputes arising
out of the employment relationship." The arbitrator is to be chosen by
lottery from the arbitrators on a panel appointed by Hazard-all of
whom are male and over the age of fifty. The arbitrator's fees (at a daily
rate of $1500) are to be paid equally by the parties, and each party is to
make a deposit of $750 in advance. The claim must be submitted within
six months of the occurrence from which the dispute arises, or it will be

2. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19702(f) (West 1992).
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deemed waived. While the employee may have representation, no
lawyers are permitted. Remedies available to the arbitrator are limited to
reinstatement and lost compensation. The agreement makes no provisions
for discovery or class actions. It provides that the arbitrator is to make
findings of fact and conclusions of law only if both parties agree that he
should do so. It states that if any provision of the agreement is held to
be invalid, the invalidity shall not affect the remainder of the agreement.
If Georgeanne's arbitration agreement is enforceable against her,
then clearly her situation is considerably altered to her detriment. She has
no reason to trust the impartiality of any of the arbitrators on the
employer's panel; she will have to advance $750 simply to have her
claim heard; she will most likely have no access to the kind of prehearing discovery that is critical to these types of cases; her claim, with
respect to prior harassment, may be time-barred under the agreement, and
even if it is not, the limitations on the arbitrator's authority would, if
enforced, deprive her of any effective remedy for that harassment; she
has neither the education nor the training to represent herself adequately
in the matter; and, in the event the arbitrator rules against her, generally
applicable arbitration law principles will insulate the award from any
meaningful judicial review. Unless the law provides some escape, either
from the agreement to arbitrate or from the detrimental consequences
which flow from the terms of her agreement and from legal principles
generally applied to commercial arbitration, she would probably be well
advised to forget her claim and make the best of it.
Georgeanne's case is hypothetical and, a made up of a conglomeration of facts from actual cases' and from a General Accounting Office
survey,4 and thus, probably not typical. We have reason to believe that
many employers have unilaterally promulgated arbitration programs

3. Aspects of Georgeanne's agreement are found in De Gaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., No.
95 Civ. 1613, 1996 WL 44226, at *1-*2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1996), and in the agreement as alleged
by Plaintiff's Amended Complaint in Burton v. A.F.M. Services (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Dec.
6, 1994) (No. 965632).
4. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATESECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, GAO/HEHS-95-150 (July 1995). The
survey is based on questionnaires sent to a random sample of 2,000 businesses that filed EEO reports
with the EEOC in 1992 and reported having more than 100 employees. See id. at 1.
A second, more recent study, has been conducted under the auspices of the Research
Committee of the National Academy of Arbitrators. See Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in
Arbitration For Unrepresented Employees (unpublished, on file with the HofstraLaborLaw Journal).
The researchers contacted 80 employers known to have internal procedures. Of these, 12 indicated
that they did not utilize outside arbitration, and 32 declined to participate or provided incomplete
information. The study is based on the responses (written and oral) of the remaining 36 employers.

See id.
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covering statutory claims since the United States Supreme Court gave its
apparent blessing to the arbitration of discrimination claims in Gilmer v.
Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,5 but we have little reliable information
about the extent or their characteristics.6 While most employers have not
been so overreaching as Hazard Insurance-indeed, some have been
quite benign- there is evidence that some if not many employers
utilize arbitration procedures that are in one or more respects one-sided.'

5. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
6. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATESECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, GAO/HEHS-95-150 (July 1995). The
GAO study reveals that approximately 10% of the businesses sampled utilized mandatory arbitration
as a dispute resolution mechanism for non-union employees, and an additional 8A% were
considering adopting such procedures. See id.at 7. The survey suggests that smaller businesses are
as likely to report using arbitration as larger ones, but that employers with some union employees
were approximately three times as likely to use arbitration as employers with none. See id.
The study, Developments in Arbitration, casts little light on the percentage of employers
which have established arbitration procedures. Of those covered by the study, 85% of the procedures
reported were implemented since Gilmer was decided, and some employers were considering
arbitration procedures, but were awaiting further judicial developments. See Bickner, supra note 4.
Approximately 75% of employers surveyed required new employees to participate in the plan as a
condition of employment; only half required existing employees to participate; approximately 25%
of the plans were voluntary for both new and current employees. See Bickner, supra note 4. Asked
their reasons for adopting arbitration procedures, most cited a desire to avoid the time and expense
necessary to litigate employment claims, and many invoked their perception that jurors were unable
to understand employment issues, or were too likely to be swayed by emotion. See Bickner, supra
note 4. Fifteen percent said they adopted the arbitration policies to improve employee relations, to
provide due process, or to "give them a voice." Ten percent cited union avoidance as a motivating
factor. See Bickner, supra note 4.
In addition to the studies, there is much anecdotal evidence. See, e.g., Janet Novack, Silver
Lining, FoRis, Nov. 21, 1994, at 124, 125 (reporting that Brown & Root, a Houston based
construction and engineering company, requires all 30,000 of its U.S. employees to settle new claims
exclusively through its arbitration system; and that Hughes Aircraft requires all new hires to agree
to settle claims through binding arbitration); Companies Using Arbitration to Avoid Court in Bias
Cases, ATLANTA J. & CONST. 7 (Mar. 20, 1994) (reporting that ITT, Rockwell International, NCR,
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan and Travelers Insurance have adopted similar policies).
7. See, e.g., Novack, supra note 6. Brown & Root offers to pay all of the arbitrator's fee and
up to $2500 in attorneys' fees for the employee. See Novack, supra note 6, at 125.
8. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST PRIVATESECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLTON, GAO/HEHS-95-150 (July 1995). The
GAO's survey notes that of the 26 policies examined, one provided for unilateral designation of the
arbitrator by the employer, two provided for joint involvement in selection of arbitrators from a list
provided by the employer (as in Georgeanne's case), one rather vaguely called for selection 'based
on the parties' preferences,"' and three did not discuss arbitral selection. Id. at 13. The remainder
utilized American Arbitration Association appointment procedures. See id. at 12-13.
The survey also reports that only three of the policies reviewed discussed access to
information by the employee through discovery. See id. at 13.
Typically, the policies provided for equal sharing in payment of the arbitrator, though four
provided for employer payment and in six the employee's share was either capped or limited to less
than half the costs. See id. at 14.
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This hypothetical case is designed to provide a basis for a comprehensive exploration of post-Gilmer legal and policy issues, with respect
to the arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims pursuant
to agreements with non-union employees. 9 The first section of this
article addresses Georgeanne's case within the context of the current
doctrine. It examines whether there are any legal grounds for her to
either escape the arbitration obligation altogether, or to obtain judicial
relief from the more one-sided aspects of the agreement which she
signed. The second section examines the policy issues posed by such a

Furthermore, while 21 of the policies reviewed expressly provided for the right of employees
to be represented during arbitration, four policies did not address the issue, and one specifically
stated that representation by an attorney would not be permitted. See id.
Most policies did not address the issue of remedies, and seven expressly authorized the
arbitrator to use any remedy available under the law, but one policy expressly prohibited the
arbitrator from assessing damages beyond those required to be compensated for actual losses. See
id.
While more than half of the policies called for the arbitrator to provide a written ruling, there
was considerable variation in the description of what was required. One policy called for the
inclusion of findings of fact and conclusions of law only if requested by both the employer and the
employee. None of the policies addressed the issue of judicial review. See id. at 14-15.
The study, Developments in Arbitration,contains several findings of interest concerning the
content of arbitration plans:
About 25% of the plans covered terminations only, and a few covered only claimed
violations of human resources policies or procedures. About half of the plans (mostly on the
West Coast) covered most or all disputes arising out of employment.
Ten percent of the plans disallowed representation by outside counsel. In some cases the
employee's legal fees are subsidized by the employer.
About two-thirds of the plans provided for discovery, but some of these limited discovery
in terms of the number of depositions or document changes. Some give the arbitrator
authority to expand discovery.
About 15% percent of the plans provided for unilateral selection of the arbitrator by the
employer, the remaining 85% percent provided for joint selection, typically through AAA or
(less frequently used) JAMS rules.
One-third of the plans limited the arbitrator's authority with respect to remedy; for example,
by placing caps on back pay, by insisting upon the employer option to pay damages fixed
by the arbitrator rather than reinstating the employee, by limiting the amount of front pay,
or by precluding punitive damages.
About half of the plans provided for the parties to share the arbitrator's fee, usually on a 5050 basis though some plans limited the employee's contribution to a fixed amount (e.g.,
$250, or the equivalent of two days salary) or to a lesser percentage (e.g., 20%), or provided
for the employer to pay the entire fee if the employee prevailed. About half of the plans
provided for the employer to pay the arbitration fees. See Bickner, supra note 4.
9. The prospect of arbitrating statutory claims under collective bargaining agreements, if the
agreements so provide, does not pose the same problems as individual employment contracts, since
the balance of bargaining power is presumptively more equal between employers and unions. It does
pose other problems, however, in terms of possible conflicts of interest between the union and the
individual employee, which are beyond the scope of this article.
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legal framework, and explores various alternatives which might be
adopted by legislatures or courts."0
III.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW

Two developments are critical to an understanding of the current
state of the law: One has to do with arbitration of statutory claims, the
other with the preemptive effect of the Federal Arbitration Act. This
section describes those developments, and then addresses unanswered
questions which persist in their wake. Readers already familiar with the
developments may wish to skip to Part IV.
A.

The Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Claims
1. The Road to Gilmer

Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") in 1925
behest of the business community, in order to overcome the
the
at
resistance which some federal courts had displayed toward the enforcement of arbitration agreements, especially those which called for the

10. I have chosen to limit the scope of this article to questions arising out of the arbitration of
statutory claims for employment discrimination. Agreements to arbitrate claims under other
employment-related statutes, such as ERISA or the Fair Labor Standards Act, and agreements to
arbitrate employment-related tort claims pose similar questions, though with some obvious
differences. Agreements to arbitrate employment-related contract claims, such as a claim for
termination in breach of an express or implied contract, on the other hand, do not implicate the same
sorts of public policy concerns. The potential which Gilmer may create for arbitration of statutory
claims in the collective bargaining context, while of great interest, is a subject for another article.
The literature already contains numerous fine contributions relating to Gilmer and its
aftermath, to which Iam indebted. See, e.g., Mark Berger, Can Employment LawArbitration Work?,
61 U. Mo. KAN. CiTY L. REv. 693 (1992); Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going With
Gilmer?- Some Ruminations on the Arbitration ofDiscrimination Claims, 11 ST. LoUIS U. PUB.
L. REv. 203 (1992); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the PrivateArbitrationof PublicLaw Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 635 (1995); Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration:
Alternative Dispute Resolution or Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
131 (1996); Jeffirey R. Knight, EnforcingArbitrationAgreementsBetween Employers andEmployees,
61 DEF. CoUNs. J. 251 (1994); Lewis Maltby, ParadiseLost-How the Gilmer Court Lost the
Opportunityfor Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM.
RTs. 1 (1994); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in Section
I of the FederalArbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary'sFailure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J.
DisP. RESOL. 259 (1991). If there is justification for yet another article, it lies in my attempt to be
somewhat more comprehensive in considering both doctrinal foundations and public policy.
11. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
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arbitration of future disputes. 2 Its key provision, section 2, provides
that agreements to arbitrate either existing or future disputes "shall be
grounds as exist at
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 13
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."'
The disputes which provided the impetus for the FAA, and which
provided the subject matter for arbitrations under the statute for the next
half century, arose out of the interpretation and application of commercial
contracts. In Wilko v. Swan, 4 the Supreme Court confronted the
question of arbitrating a statutory claim. That case involved a claim by
a customer against a brokerage firm for damages under section 12(2) of
the Securities Act of 1933." The Court refused to permit the arbitration
of a statutory claim, not because the agreement did not fall within the
literal scope of the Arbitration Act, but because the agreement was
to
invalid by reason of the Securities Act's ban on any "'stipulation ...
16
waive compliance with any provision"' of the substantive statute.
In reaching its conclusion of non-arbitrability, the Wilko Court
distinguished between pre-dispute and post-dispute agreements to
arbitrate.' 7 In the former case, enforcement would deprive the investor
of options with respect to choice of court and venue, at a time when the
investor was least able to evaluate the consequences."8 More broadly,
the Court reasoned that the limited scope ofjudicial review of arbitration
awards would deprive the investor of any assurance that the law was
being applied properly. 9
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,20 the Court expanded upon
Wilko's critique of statutory claims for arbitration. The case arose in the
context of a collective bargaining agreement subject to the National
Labor Relations Act 2' ('NLRA").22 The claimant sought to pursue a
claim of racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

12. "Future disputes" are disputes which may occur in the future from the perspective of the
agreement, as distinguished from a dispute existing at the time of the agreement.
13. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
14. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by, Rodriquez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,

490 U.S. 477 (1989).
15. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 428; 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1994).
16. Id. at 430.

17. See id. at 435.
18. See 1d.

19. See id. at 436-37.
20. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).

21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994).
22. See id. at 38-39.
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196423 ("Title VII") after losing his claim for wrongful termination
24
under arbitration under the agreement. In deciding that the worker
could have (as the employer characterized it) a second bite at the apple,
the Court relied in part on the limited nature of the arbitrator's contractual authority. The Alexander Court reiterated that the arbitrator's role is
to settle disputes in matters which involve interpretation or application
2
of the collective bargaining agreement ---and upon the potential for
conflict of interest in matters involving racial tension, between the union
and an individual worker.26 In addition, however, the Court spoke more
broadly of the shortcomings of the arbitration process in implementing
of statutory policy: the lack of a complete record, the inapplicability of
normal rules of evidence, and the absence of or severe limitations on
"discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under
oath."27 The Court also noted the lack of any requirement that arbitrators state reasons for their awards, and the public nature of claims under
Title VI. 28 The Court declared in sweeping terms, "the resolution of
statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of the courts,
and judicial construction has proved especially necessary with respect to
Title VII, whose broad language frequently can be given meaning only
29
by reference to public law concepts."
But even as it decided Alexander, the Court began to question the
scope of its holding in Wilko in the context of international transac3
tions." In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, decided the same year, the Court
declined to apply the Wilko rationale to a claim under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 193432, which arose out of an international business
agreement. 3 Assuming, arguendo, that Wilko applied to the 1934 Act,
the Court then emphasized the international aspects of the transaction,
and analogized the arbitration agreement to the sort of choice-of-law
3
Off-Shore Co. 1
provision3 4 it had upheld in Bremen v. Zapata

23. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 42.
See id. at 53.
See id. at 58 n.19.
Id. at 57-58.
See id. at 58.
Id. at 57.
See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515 (1974).

31. Id.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1994).

33. See id. at 513.
34. See id.at 515.
35. 407 U.S, 1 (1972).
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First, the Court insisted that the FAA called for a presumption of
arbitrability in interpreting an agreement to arbitrate; if there was a
public policy opposed to arbitration of statutory claims, it should not be
implemented through a "distort[ed]" reading of the agreement.36 Second,
the Court declined to find, in the FAA itself, any presumption against
arbitration of statutory claims; if an agreement to arbitrate such a claim
was not to be enforced, such a result would have to be premised upon
congressional intent as reflected in the statute under which the claim is
made.37 The Court declared that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than
judicial, forum. 38
Any doubts as to where the Supreme Court was going in Mitsubishi
Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth were soon dispelled. In ShearsonlAmerican Express Inc. v. McMahon," the Court distinguished Wilko to
hold that plaintiff's claim under section 10(b) of the Securities Act of
1934, as well as his RICO claims, were subject to arbitration.4' Additionally, the Court formally laid Wilko to rest in Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. 41 The stage was set for Gilmer.
2.

Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.42

When Robert Gilmer became Manager of Financial Services for
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. in May of 1981, the nature of the services
he was to render required that he register as a securities representative
with the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE"). 43 His registration
application (Form U-4) contained an agreement to arbitrate "'any dispute
claim or controversy' between him and Interstate" that the rules of the
Exchange require to be arbitrated.' Further, the rules of the Exchange
provided for arbitration of "' [a]ny controversy ...arising out of [his]

36. Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985).
37. See id. at 628.
38. Id.
39. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
40. See id. at 231-33.
41. 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989) (holding a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate claims under the
Securities Act to be enforceable, regardless of the fact that the claims were decided outside the
judicial forum).
42. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
43. See id. at 23. As a securities representative, federal law required his registration. See 42
U.S.C. § 406(a)(1) (1994).
44. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
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employment or termination of employment.""' 5 When Gilmer was
terminated after six years, he brought suit in federal court, claiming that
he was terminated because of his age, in violation of the Age Discrimina7
tion in Employment Act46 ("ADEA")." Interstate filed a motion to
compel arbitration of the ADEA claim."8 The district court denied the
motion, based on Alexander and on the court's view that Congress
intended to preserve a judicial forum for adjudication of ADEA
50
claims.4 9 However, the Fourth Circuit, and ultimately the Supreme
5 ' disagreed.
Court,
When the case reached the Supreme Court, amici curiae advanced
an argument on Gilmer's behalf which Gilmer had failed to assert in the
lower courts: that his arbitration agreement fell within the FAA section
1 exclusion of "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees,
or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."5 2 Justice Stevens, dissenting, would have reached that issue, and
concluded that the exemption was broad enough to include Gilmer's
agreement.53 However, the majority declined to consider the scope of
that exclusion, noting that Gilmer's arbitration agreement was contained
not in any contract of employment, but in his contract with a third
party.5 Accordingly, the Court considered only Gilmer's argument that
arbitration of age discrimination claims was inconsistent with the
statutory framework and purposes of the ADEA, as well as with the
Court's earlier opinion in Alexander.5
The Court distinguished Alexander on several grounds: the agreement which Gilmer signed did not limit the arbitrator to the decision of
contractual disputes; the potential for conflict with a union did not exist
for Gilmer; and in any event Gilmer's case arose under the Federal

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

d.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
See id. at 23-24.
See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
See id.
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir. 1990).
See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27.

52. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994)).

53. See id. at 38-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 25 n.2.
55. See id. at 27-35.
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Arbitration Act while Alexander was decided under the NLRA.56 These
distinctions did not confront Alexander's critique of arbitration as a
vehicle for implementing statutory norms, but there was no need. The
Court had already undermined that critique in the Mitsubishi Motors
trilogy and in the earlier part of the Gilmer opinion itself.
Gilmer argued that withholding a judicial forum on the basis of
arbitration agreements such as the one he had signed would undermine
the statutory scheme, which provided good reasons for a judicial
forum. 7 He insisted that the absence of written opinions would reduce
public awareness of particular discriminatory practices, would undercut
the policy of deterrence, and with the limited review available for
arbitration awards, would stifle development of the law.58 Class actions
and equitable, class-wide relief, essential to the effective implementation
of ADEA policy, would not necessarily be available, discovery was
likely to be limited, and arbitrators might well be biased." Finally,
equality of bargaining power, which might be counted upon to correct
these problems, was absent in the typical employer-employee relation60
ship.
The Court dismissed each of these arguments seriatim, thereby
discounting their cumulative impact, and it dismissed them in a manner
which seemed to reflect a certain impatience." To a considerable extent,
the Court relied upon what it had already held or said in the Mitsubishi
Motors trilogy.62 That the ADEA was designed to further important
social policies did not serve to distinguish it from the Sherman Act, the
Securities Act, or RICO, all of which had been held amenable to
arbitration,63 and Gilmer's "generalized attacks" on the adequacy of
arbitration procedures were "'out of step with [the Court's] current strong
endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving

56. See id. at 35. Whether the FAA applies to collective bargaining agreements is an issue
which the Supreme Court has not yet decided. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957) (holding that provisions to arbitrate in collective bargaining agreements are enforceable under
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act). This issue turns upon the scope of the FAA
section 1 exemption for employment contracts.
57. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26-27.
58. See id. at 31.
59. See id. at 30-32.
60. See id. at 32-33.
61. See id. at 30-33.
62. See id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
627, 628, 634 (1985)).
63. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
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disputes."'"M Claims under the ADEA, like claims under these other
statutes, were amenable to private settlement, and the effect of arbitration
upon the implementation of public policy was no different; there would
still be judicial opinions arising out of claims not subject to arbitration." Gilmer's complaint regarding the inadequacy of discovery
similarly had no greater validity in the ADEA context than in the context
66
of the other statutes which the court had considered. Contextually, the
court reasoned, limited discovery is a tradeoff for more expeditious
proceedings and relaxed rules of evidence,67 and, "'although judicial
scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is
sufficient68to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the
statute'.
In addition to invoking its newfound enthusiasm for arbitrating
statutory claims in general, the Court focused upon the particular
enforcement scheme of the ADEA.69 In the course of rejecting Gilmer's
arguments that arbitration was inadequate to the implementation of
statutory policy, the Court indicated its view that arbitration could not
preclude an individual from filing a charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), thereby, triggering the EEOC's
jurisdiction to investigate and attempt to conciliate.7" Further, arbitration
could not preclude the EEOC itself from instituting actions, including
actions seeking class-wide and equitable relief.7"
Moreover, in rejecting Gilmer's specific criticisms of arbitration, the
Court relied in part upon the particular arbitration procedures provided
for in the NYSE rules,72 as well as and upon circumstances pertaining
to the plaintiff himself.73 For example, the Court rejected Gilmer's
argument that arbitration panels were likely to be biased as mere
speculation, pointing to NYSE rules which made information about
arbitrators available to the parties, and allowed each party a peremptory

64. Id. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481

(1989)).
65. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
66. See id. at 31.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 32 n.4 (quoting Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220,232 (1987)).
69. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28-29.
70. See id. at 27-28.
71. See id.
2608-2610, 2612(d),
72. See id. at 30-32 (relying on Arbitration, N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCH)
1995)).
(Nov.
2627(f)
2627(e),
2627(a),
2619-2620,
73. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29.
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challenge in addition to unlimited challenges for cause.74 Noting that the
FAA itself provides that an arbitration award may be denied enforcement
75
"'[w]here there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators,'
the Court concluded that Gilmer has not shown
these "provisions are
76
inadequate to guard against potential bias.
Similarly, with respect to Gilmer's complaint regarding the limited
nature of discovery in arbitration, the Court pointed to NYSE rules which
allowed for depositions as well as document production, information
requests, and subpoenas to witnesses, and concluded that Gilmer had not
shown that these procedures would be "inadequate."7 7 In rejecting
Gilmer's contention with respect to the lack of written opinions in
arbitration, the Court observed that NYSE rules provide for written
awards containing the names of the parties and a summary of the issues
and a decision, and for such awards to be available for public inspection.78 Addressing Gilmer's concern about limitations on equitable relief
and class actions, the Court noted that the NYSE rules did not restrict the
type of relief available, and they do provide for consolidation of
claims. 79 Finally, in dismissing Gilmer's argument based on inequality
of bargaining power, the court stated:
Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that
the agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds "for the revocation of
any contract." ... There is no indication in this case, however, that
Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced or defrauded into
agreeing to the arbitration clause or his registration application. As with
the claimed procedural inadequacies discussed above, this claim of
unequal bargaining power is best left for resolution in specific cases.8"
All of this suggests there may be some prospects for confining
Gilmer on the basis of its statutory and factual context, a subject which
I will explore herein.

74. See id. at 30.
75. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 10(b)).
76. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 31-32.

79. See id. at 32.
80. Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
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B.

The Preemptive Effect of the FAA

While the Supreme Court was travelling toward the open embrace
of arbitration of statutory claims as a matter of federal law, it embarked
upon another enterprise which was to have broad ramifications for the
81
legal landscape. California's Franchise Investment Law, which governs
certain aspects of the relationship between franchisors and franchisees,
contains a no-waiver provision worded identically to the 1933 Securities
Act language which the Supreme Court held in Wilko to preclude
2
enforcement of agreements to arbitrate claims under that statute. The
California Supreme Court interpreted that provision in the same manner
as the United States Supreme Court had interpreted it in Wilko, to
conclude that a franchisee could sue under the Franchise Investment Law
without regard to a provision for arbitration contained in its standardform franchise agreement. 3 -The Supreme Court reversed in Southland
Corp. v Keating.' In its view, the FAA's mandate that arbitration
agreements subject to its provisions be enforced was binding upon
California, and precluded that state from creating a right by statute that
could be enforced only through litigation."
In Perry v. Thomas, 6 the Court applied the Southland preemption
principle to hold that an employee was obligated by agreement to
arbitrate his wage claims despite an express statutory provision exempting wage claims from arbitration. 87 In addition, in Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,8 the Court assured the broadest possible
scope for the preemption principle, holding that the language in FAA
section 2 which makes the Act applicable to any "'contract evidencing
a transaction involving commerce,"' 89 was intended to extend the reach
81. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31019 (West 1996).
82. See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438.
83. See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1203-04 (Cal. 1982). The author of this
article was also the author of the opinion. See id. at 1194.
84. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).

85. See id. at 19. Justice O'Connor dissented, arguing that Congress did not intend for the FAA
to have such preemptive effect. See id. at 21 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Subsequently Justice Thomas
and Justice Scalia have come to share that view, and have expressed a willingness to overturn
Southland. See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834, 844-51 (1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (Thomas, J., dissenting). However, Justice O'Connor has declared her
commitment to Southland on grounds of stare decisis. See id. at 844 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).

87. See id. at 489-90.
88. 115 S.Ct. 834 (1995).

89. Id. at 836 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)).
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of the statute to the limits of Congressional power under the Commerce
Clause. 90
One consequence of the Southlandpreemption principle is that, with
respect to contracts subject to the FAA, Gilmer applies to claims under
state as well as federal statutes, presumably without regard to contrary
state policy.91 The Court has declared that state law may be applied in
determining the scope of the exception to enforceability declared in FAA
section 2-"'save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract"'-but only so long as that law "'arose to
govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of
contracts generally."' 92 Thus, with respect to contracts subject to the
FAA, a state is not free to apply principles which target arbitration
provisions uniquely, such as a requirement that such a provision, to be
enforceable, appear in capital letters on the front page.93 We shall be
examining the implications of that limitation after further examination of
the scope of the FAA itself.94
IV. BEYOND GILMER
Gilmer was, on the surface at least, a narrow opinion in a number

of respects. It was decided in the context of an arbitration provision
imposed, not by Gilmer's employer, but by the New York Stock
Exchange, a governmental regulated entity, as a condition of Gilmer's

registering to do the type of work for which registration was legally
required. 9 The agreement, or at least the rules of the Exchange which
they incorporated by reference, provided reasonably clear notice to a6
person in Gilmer's position that statutory claims would be arbitrable.
The Court found Gilmer to be an "experienced businessman," who was
neither coerced nor defrauded into the agreement. 97 The agreement did
not purport to modify any of the substantive provisions of any applicable

90. See id. As a consequence, the Court held that a homeowner was obligated to arbitrate a
claim against a pest control company pursuant to an arbitration clause in the applicable contract,
despite an Alabama statute which declares pre-dispute arbitration agreements to be unenforceable.
See id. at 843.
91. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody, & Co., 619 N.E.2d 998, 1001 (N.Y. 1993) (holding
that a claim under New York's civil rights statutes is subject to arbitration under the FAA).
92. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492-93 n.9.
93. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 1657 (1996).
94. See infra notes 120-66 and accompanying text.
95. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
96. See id.
97. Id. at 33.
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statute, restrict the type of relief available, or preclude Gilmer from filing
a claim with the EEOC.98 The Court apparently considered the arbitration procedure to be a fair and efficacious one, both with regards to the
selection of arbitrators and to the hearing itself.99 The Court found that
NYSE rules provided for discovery, including depositions, for written
awards open to public view, and for collective proceedings. 00
In all these respects, Gilmer is theoretically distinguishable from
other cases which might arise, such as Georgeanne's case, and to that
extent leaves certain questions open for future argument. One question
explicitly left open is the scope of the FAA section 1 exclusion of
contracts of employment, and we will address that question first.
Assuming that the answer will not help Georgeanne, we will proceed to
examine the possibility, first, that the FAA itself (or state law permissibly
applicable under the FAA) places limits on the enforceability of
agreements such as Georgeanne's, and second, that the statute under
which the employee's claim is asserted (in Georgeanne's case, Title VII)
should be interpreted to limit the enforceability of agreements to
arbitrate.' 0 '
A.

What Is the Scope of the FAA Section 1 Exclusion of "'Any Other
Class of Workers Engaged in Interstate or Foreign Commerce"
(And What Difference Does it Make)?

If Georgeanne's contract is excluded from FAA coverage, then
Gilmer does not apply. That does not necessarily mean that her contract
will not be enforced. An argument could be made that by excluding
employment contracts from FAA coverage Congress intended to insulate
them from enforcement under state law as well."0 2 Subject to that

98. See id. at 32 & n.4.

99. See id. at 30-31.
100. See id. at 31-32.
101. Omitted from this analysis is the possibility that the National Labor Relations Act would
be interpreted to prohibit an employer from insisting upon an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims,
perhaps on the theory that resort to statute is an activity protected under section 7 against employer
interference. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1994). In Bentley's Luggage Corp., No. 12-CA-16658 (1994),
the NLRB's General Counsel authorized issuance of a complaint against an employer who
discharged employees for refusing to sign an agreement to arbitrate any dispute concerning his

employment or termination of employment before filing legal action. See Feds Oppose Requiring
Workers to Arbitrate, 14 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LTG. 39, 39 (1996). However, the theory
may have been that the arbitration agreement purported to preclude the filing of charges with the

NLRB, an activity which is clearly protected despite Gilmer. See id.
102. But cf Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (holding that concerted refusal to work
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argument, however, the enforceability of her agreement to arbitrate would
depend upon the law of her state, and state law comes in a variety of
shapes and sizes.10 3 Some states do not enforce agreements to arbitrate
future disputes." g Others exclude from a general rule of enforceability
arbitration agreements contained in employment contracts, 10 5 or agreements made as a condition of employment,0 6 agreements calling for
arbitration of employer-employee disputes,107 or arbitration clauses in
contracts of adhesion.'0 8 A recent Kentucky statute prohibits employers
from requiring, as a condition of employment, that employees or
applicants agree to arbitrate any existing or future claim under state or
federal law.0 9 Some states have rules aimed at assuring notice and
consent by insisting that the arbitration clause appear in a prominent
place,"0 or in prominent type."' Further, some insist that the arbitra2
tion clause make specific reference to the arbitration statute, or that
3
it be separately initialed by the parties or by their attorneys." Finally,
some states have common law rules, limiting the enforcement of
particular agreements to arbitrate, that are of questionable application in
the face of FAA preemption. If the FAA and its preemption principles
do not apply, all of these varying state law rules would come into play.

overtime, while arguably neither prohibited nor protected by the Labor Management Relations Act,
was nevertheless intended by Congress to be free of regulation).
103. There have been useful surveys of state law. See Jonathan E. Breckenridge, Bargaining
Unfairnessand Agreements to Arbitrate: Judicialand LegislativeApplication of ContractDefenses
to ArbitrationAgreements, 1991 ANN. SuRV. AM. L. 925 (1991); Henry C. Strickland, The FAA's
InterstateCommerce Requirement: What's Leftfor State ArbitrationLaw, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385
(1992).
104. Four states (Alabama, Hawaii, Mississippi and West Virginia) have pre-modern arbitration
statutes which provide only for the submission of existing controversies to arbitration. See ALA.
CODE § 6-6-1 (Miehie Supp. 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 658-2 (1993); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-15101 (Law Co-op 1972 & Supp 1995); W. VA. CODE § 55-10-1 (1990).
105. See ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1517 (West 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 679A.1(2)(b)
(West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-401(c)(2) (1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.050 (Michie
1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9:4216 (West 1991); MD. ANN. CODE, CS. &
JUD. PROC. § 34-206(b) (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1995).
106. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10(b)(2) (Law Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1995).
107. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-108-201 (Michie 1987).
108. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 435.350 (West 1992).
109. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 336.700 (Michie 1995).
110. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995) ("Notice that a contract is subject to
arbitration" be "typed in underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract."). The Supreme
Court has held that Montana may not apply that requirement to a contract subject to the FAA. See
Doctor's Assocs. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1657 (1996).
111. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1548-10(a) (Law Co-op 1976 & Supp. 1995).
112. See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-206(b) (1989 & Supp. 1995).
113. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-2(c)(9) (Supp. 1996).
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Two interpretive alternatives have been advanced. The first, reads
FAA section 1 as exempting all contracts of employment." 4 The
second sees section 1 as exempting only those classes of workers who,
like railroad employees and seamen, are engaged in the carrying of goods
across state or international lines." 5 A good deal has been written in
support of one position or the other, and I see no reason for recapitulating that discussion here. Professor Finkin has argued, quite persuasively
it seems to me, that Congress intended to exclude all employment
contracts from coverage.1 6 The support for the statute came entirely
from business interests seeking to assure enforceability of arbitration
terms in commercial agreements, and while the impetus for the exemption came from the Seamen's Union and included concern over the
impact of the statute upon seamen's contracts, legislative history reflects
a broader concern." 7 It seems that, due to likely inequality of bargaining power between employer and employee, enforcement of arbitration
provisions contained in employment contracts might yield unfair results.
It is not easy to explain why Congress, if it wanted to exempt all
employment contracts, did not simply say so. Perhaps Congress thought
that the language of the section 1 exemption described all contracts
within the reach of congressional power at the time. In any event, it is
considerably more difficult to explain why Congress would want to
exempt only a certain category of employment contracts, and in particular
that category most obviously within the reach of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause.
A plausible explanation exists in the case of railroad employees and
seamen. Their employment relationships were subject to special
regulation." 8 However, absent some rational explanation, the classification that would be created by a narrow reading of the third category of
exemption, seems to raise constitutional problems even under the lowest
level of scrutiny required by the Equal Protection principle of the Fifth
Amendment. On that ground alone, it seems to me, that the narrow
reading of the section 1 exemption-what I call the "shlepper
rule""'-should be avoided.

114. See Matthew W. Finkin, Workers' Contracts Under the United States ArbitrationAct: An
Essay in Historical Clarification,17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282 (1996).
115. See id. at 290.
116. See id. at 298.
117. See id. at 297.
118. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994); Finkin, supra note 114, at 283.
119. In doing so, I acknowledge that I take certain liberties with the Yiddish language. In
Yiddish, to "shlep", from the German "schleppen," means to drag, or pull. The noun "shlepper" has
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If we are to be Georgeanne's lawyers, however, we would have to
advise her that the prospects of a broad reading of the section 1
exemption, however meritorious, are not the most favorable. The tide in
the lower courts, influenced by the general policy of favoring arbitration,
120
has been running heavily in favor of the shlepper rule, and there is
no sound basis for predicting that the Supreme Court will reject it. This
is not to say that the issue is not genuinely open in the Supreme Court.
The Gilmer Court's refusal to consider the issue on the ground that
Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate was contained in a contract with a third
party, has greater substance than Justice Stevens was prepared to
acknowledge. Gilmer's application to the New York Stock Exchange was
"required by his employment" in much the same way as a chauffeur's
license is required of someone who seeks employment as a truck driver,
and the Exchange is subject to supervision by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"). 12 ' The Supreme Court could well
conclude that the concerns which led Congress to exempt employment
contracts from coverage under the FAA were not present in Gilmer's
case. But, the virtually unbridled enthusiasm which the Court has
displayed toward methods of diverting disputes from the judicial system
may lead it to reject that argument.
B. Does the FAA or PermissiblyApplicable State Law Place Any
Relevant Limitations on Agreements by Employees to Arbitrate
Employment-Related Claims?
In Perry v. Thomas,"z the plaintiff sought to avoid arbitration of
his wage claim on two grounds. One was the state statutory provision
which purported to allow access to the courts notwithstanding an
agreement to arbitrate 123 and which this the Supreme Court disposed

a pejorative connotation, suggesting someone who performs work slowly, or maladroitly. See LEO
ROSTEN, THE JOYS OF YIDDISH 346 (1968).

120. Several circuit courts have developed case law which supports a narrow reading of the
exclusion. See Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996); Asplundh Tree
Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 1995); Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers
Local Union, 739 F.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984); Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 468
F.2d 1064, 1069 (2d Cir. 1982); Tenney Eng'g, Inc. v. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, 207
F.2d 450,452 (3d Cir. 1953); Golenia v. Bob Baker Toyota, 915 F. Supp. 201,203 (S.D. Ca. 1996).
Only the Fourth Circuit has chosen a more broad reading of the exclusion. See United Elec. Radio
& Mach. Workers v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954).
121. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
122. 482 U.S. 483 (1987).

123. See id. at 486.
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of on the basis of Southland.'24 In addition, the plaintiff in Perry
argued that the provision for arbitration, which he was required to sign
as a condition of employment, was unconscionable, in that it called for
arbitration by a presumptively biased arbitrator (i.e. an arbitrator
appointed through the procedures of the New York Stock Exchange) and
failed to allow for adequate discovery." 5
Perry's second argument was premised on a decision of the
California Supreme Court in Graham v. Scissor-Tail.1 26 In that case,
the plaintiff Bill Graham, a well-known promoter of rock music, entered
into a series of contracts with a musical group on forms provided by the
Musicians Union. 27 Each contract contained a clause providing.that
"the parties will submit every claim, dispute, controversy or difference ... arising out of or connected with this contract ...for determination by the [Union's] International Executive Board.' ' 2 Notwithstanding Graham's prominence, and the fact that certain of the contract terms
"of relatively minor significance" were subject to negotiation, the court
characterized the contract as "adhesive" with respect to the arbitration
term because it was imposed, along with terms governing the manner and
rate of compensation, through the Union's control over the musical
group, on a non-negotiable basis. 129 The court therefore invoked two
principles which it deemed applicable to adhesive contracts (or provisions) generally: (1) that such a contract (or provision) will not be
enforced against the "adhering" party if it "does not fall within the
reasonable expectations" of that party, and (2) that even if it meets the
reasonable expectations test, it will not be enforced "if, considered in its
context, it is unduly oppressive or 'unconscionable.' '1 30 The court
concluded that the provision for arbitration in Graham's contract met the
first test but failed the second "because it designates an arbitrator who,
by reason of its status and identity, is presumptively biased in favor of
one party.' 131 While parties are generally free to designate as an
arbitrator anyone they wish, including a person who by reason of
relationship or some similar factor can be expected to adopt something
other than a "neutral" stance, when the contract is the product of

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

See id. at 489-91.
See id. at 492 n.9.
623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
See id. at 167-69.
Id. at 168.
Id. at 172.
Id. at 172-73.
Id. at 173 (emphasis added).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

21

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 14:1

circumstances suggesting adhesion, "the possibility of overreaching by
the dominant party looms large."' 32 Therefore, the contract "must be
scrutinized with particular care to insure that the party of lesser
bargaining power, in agreeing thereto, is not left in a position depriving
him of any realistic and fair opportunity to prevail in a dispute under its
terms." 133 Rather, "certain 'minimum levels of integrity' [must] be
muster."' 134
achieved if the arrangement in question is to pass judicial
That requirement is not met when the designated arbitrator is "one whose
interests are so allied with those of the party that, for all practical
to the same disabilities which prevent the party
purposes, he is subject'135
serving.'
from
himself
Prior to Perry there was a split of authority within California as to
the applicability of Graham principles to the NYSE arbitration procedures. 136 The Supreme Court did not decide the merits of that issue, but
remanded it to the state court with the following admonition:
We note ...the choice-of-law issue when defenses such as Thomas'
so-called "standing" and unconscionability arguments are asserted. In
instances such as these, the text of Section 2 provides the touchstone
for choosing between state-law principles and the principles of federal
common law envisioned by the passage of that statute: An agreement
to arbitrate is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable as a matter offederal
law "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." Thus, state law, whether of legislative or
judicial origin, is applicable ifthat law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.
A state-law principle that takes its meaning precisely from the fact that
a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comport with the requirement
of Section 2. A court may not, then, in assessing the rights of litigants
to enforce an arbitration agreement, construe that agreement in a
manner different from that in which it otherwise construes nonarbitration agreements under state law. Nor may a court rely on the

132. Id. at 176.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 177. The court's reference here was to a New York case, In re Cross & Brown Co.,
4 A.D.2d 501, 502-03 (N.Y. App. Div. 1957) (refusing to enforce, on grounds of "natural justice,"
a provision in an employment contract which provided for arbitration by the employer itself).
136. See Tonetti v. Shirley, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1144 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting the Hope rule,
believing it was compelled to do so by more recent federal cases holding the NYSE's arbitration
procedures to be fair and enforceable); Hope v. Superior Ct., 122 Cal. App. 3d 147 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981) (holding NYSE procedures unconscionable under the Graham test, authored by the author of
this article). But see Parr v. Superior Ct., 139 Cal. App. 3d 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would
enable the court to effect what we hold today the legislature cannot.137

On remand, the California Court of Appeal viewed the Supreme
Court's directive in Perry to mean that it was not free to apply the
Graham principle, and on those grounds, it ordered arbitration of the
dispute. 3 The Ninth Circuit has since fallen line with this line of
reasoning.139 But, in terms of the principle declared in Perry, it would
seem that these courts are not correct. If the Perry Court believed that
dismissal of the plaintiff's case followed from that principle, then these
later courts have misinterpreted its meaning. The unconscionability
doctrine is of general application, not peculiar to arbitration agreements, 140 and while its application necessarily requires some assessment
of the fairness of particular terms, along with overall imbalance and
weaknesses in the bargaining process, 141 that is not the same as singling arbitration agreements out for special treatment. Obviously, the
FAA policy favoring arbitration would be offended by a ruling that a

137. Perry,482 U.S. at 492-93 n.9 (citations omitted).
138. See Thomas v. Perry, 200 Cal. App. 3d 510, 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
139. See Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992).
140. See, e.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d 165, 172-73 (Cal. 1981).
Generally speaking, there are two judicially imposed limitations on the enforcement of
adhesion contracts or provisions thereof. The first is that such a contract or provision
which does not fall within the reasonable expectations of the weaker or "adhering" party
will not be enforced against him. The second a principle of equity applicable to all
contracts generally is that a contract or provision, even if consistent with the reasonable
expectations of the parties, will be denied enforcement if, considered in its context, is
unduly oppressive or "unconscionable."
Id. (citations omitted).
The adhesion/unconscionability principles applied in Graham had previously been applied
to contracts not involving arbitration clauses. See e.g., Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503,
514 (Cal. 1985) (holding the terms of an adhesion contract unconscionable where its terms allowed
a bank to charge an unreasonable fee for processing checks drawn from accounts with insufficient
funds); Ellis v. McKinnon, 23 Cal. App. 4th 1796, 1804, 1807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding
forfeiture provisions of an adhesive contract to be unconscionable).
141. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. e (1979).
Particular terms may be unconscionable whether or not the contract as a whole is
unconscionable. Some types of terms are not enforced, regardless of context; ...[olther
terms may be unconscionable in some contexts but not in others. Overall imbalance and
weaknesses in the bargaining process are then important.
Id. (citation omitted).
In assessing unconscionability, it may be relevant to consider "gross inequality of bargaining
power," and whether the provision appears in a "standardized agreement." Id. at § 208 cmts. a &
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provision calling for arbitration is unfair per se, but whether particular
terms of such a provision should be regarded as unfair, and unenforceable in light of the adhesive nature of a particular agreement, is another
matter entirely.
42
The Court's recent opinion in Doctor' Associates v. Casarotto
43 and apparently to
appears to put a new gloss on the Perry footnote,
Georgeanne's advantage. While reiterating its opposition to the singlingout of arbitration agreements for special treatment, the Court stated:
Repeating our observation in Perry, the text of Section 2 declares that
state law may be applied "if that law arose to govern issues concerning
the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally."
Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress or
unconscionability,may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements
without contravening Section 2. l 4
While that language appears to open the door to arguments that
would prove useful to one in Georgeanne's situation, several considerations counsel caution. First, as a matter of state law these traditional
contract defenses are difficult to come by. A party seeking revocation on
grounds of fraud must ordinarily show detrimental reliance on intention14
al, or at least reckless, misrepresentations of material fact, ' and it is
unlikely that Georgearme could show that. Duress typically requires a
showing that the contract was obtained either through physical compulsion or a "wrongful" threat, 146 and a threat of non-employment is
unlikely to suffice. 47 The unconscionability doctrine, which focuses
both upon inequality of bargaining power and the unfairness of particular
terms,1 4 1 unquestionably holds out the greatest hope of the three, but
even here Georgeanne is likely to have an uphill battle. Not all state
142. 116 S. Ct. 1652 (1996).
143. Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
144. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. at 1656 (alterations in original) (second emphasis added) (citation
omitted).
145. See Jonathan E. Breckenridge, BargainingUnfairnessandAgreements to Arbitrate:Judicial
and Legislative Application of ContractDefenses to Arbitration Agreements, 2 ANN. SURV. AM. L.,
925, 938-42 (1991).
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1979).
147. See Rust v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 715, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (rejecting
argument of duress advanced by employee required to accept NYSE arbitration). But see Standard
Coffee Serv. Co. v. Babin, 472 So. 2d 124, 127 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding employer insistence
that current employee sign arbitration agreement under threat of termination constituted duress). The
Babin holding is criticized by Professor Ware. See Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and
Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFsTRA L. REV. (forthcoming Fall 1996).
148. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmts. d & e (1979).
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courts have accepted the reasoning of Graham,149 and even in the terms
of that opinion, the fact that the arbitrator is to be chosen from a panel
designated by the employer may not rise to the level of presumptive bias.
Other aspects of Georgeanne's contract considered in combination would
arguably support a characterization of unconscionability, especially in a
state such as California which has developed principles of "common law
due process." 5 ' Thus, the Graham court declared that "[w]hen it can
be demonstrated, . . that the clear effect of the established procedure of
the arbitrator will be to deny the resisting party a fair opportunity to
present his position, the court should refuse to compel arbitration."''
The court confined that principle narrowly, however, to situations "when
the applicable procedures essentially preclude the possibility of a fair
hearing,"' 5 2 and Georgeanne may have difficulty proving that.
Second, there exists a body of federal principles which must be
applied in interpreting contracts subject to the FAA, including principles
which govern the allocation of authority between courts and arbitrators.
Under Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin,'53 "arbitration clauses as a
matter of federal law are 'separable' from the contracts in which they are
embedded,"'' 54 so that, "a federal court may consider only issues
relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate." 55 Thus, while a court may adjudicate a claim of fraud in the
inducement of the arbitration clause itself, it is for the arbitrator to pass
upon a claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally.'56
To avoid arbitration on grounds of fraud, therefore, Georgeanne would

149. See, e.g., In re Jerry Kravat Entertainment Servs., Inc., 459 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.

1983) (rejecting Graham as inconsistent with New York law). Courts in several states have adopted
the Graham analysis. See, e.g., Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, Ltd., 840 P.2d 1013. 1016
(Ariz. 1992); Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 760 P.2d 19, 23 (Idaho 1988); Chimes
v. Oritani Motor Hotel, 480 A.2d 218, 221-22 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984). For critique of
Graham on its merits, see Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and
Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459 (1995).

150. See generally Matthew 0. Tobriner & Joseph R. Grodin, The Individual and the Public
Service Enterprise in the New IndustrialState, 55 CAL. L. REv. 1247 (1967).
151. See Graham, 623 P.2d at 176-77.
152. Id. at 177 n.23.

153. See Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin, 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
154. Id. at 402.
155. Id. at 404. A similar problem may arise in connection with unconscionability claims. See
Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying Prima Paint to an
unconscionability claim because, inter alia, plaintiff's assertions of inequality of bargaining power
extended to the entire agreement).
156. See id. at 403-04.
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the arbitration
need to allege and prove that the agreement containing
157
clause was itself infected by fraudulent representation.
Finally, while the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that state
law governs the issue of revocability so long as it is a law of general
application,"' it would be unwise to accept that declaration at face
value, especially when it comes to the application of unconscionability
principles. Clearly, the Supreme Court would not permit astate court, or
a federal court on the basis of state law, to deny enforcement of a
contract similar to that upheld in Gilmer because state law deems the
New York Stock Exchange procedure to be unfair. If the Supreme Court
is to maintain its insistence upon the preemptive effect of the FAA, the
development of a uniform body of federal law with respect to the
59 and
revocability of agreements under that statute is inevitable,'
Goergeanne's invocation of unconscionability principles must take that
into account.
There is one other provision of the FAA which needs to be taken
into account in assessing Georgeanne's situation. Section 10(b) provides,
as one ground for withholding enforcement from an arbitration award,
"'evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators."",160 The Supreme
Court has held in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. ContinentalCasualty
Co., 6' that an award should be overturned under this standard where
a supposedly neutral arbitrator was discovered to have an undisclosed

157. See, e.g., Southside Internists v. Janus Capital Corp., 741 F. Supp. 1536 (N.D. Ala. 1990)
(holding that allegations of fraud, duress or unconscionability in the making of a contract are not
sufficient to invalidate the arbitration clause itself); Hurlbut v. Gantshar, 674 F. Supp. 385 (D.Mass.
1987) (finding that the separability doctrine precludes consideration of plaintiff's argument that
arbitration agreement should not be enforced because broker rushed her into signing the investment
contract). The Fifth Circuit has applied the PrimaPaintrule to hold that an attack on an employment
agreement containing an arbitration provision as an "unconscionable contract of adhesion" presents
an issue as to the formation of the contract generally, rather than the arbitration clause itself, and on
that ground must be submitted to the arbitrator. See Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745
(5th Cir. 1996). The court based this conclusion not only on the ground that the plaintiff claimed
that other aspects of her contract were unconscionable, but also on the ground that she alleged the
entire contract was the product of inequality of bargaining power, a ground that would apply to most
unconscionability attacks. See Rojas, 87 F.3d at 749 n.3.
158. See Perry,482 U.S. at 492 n.9.
159. Cf Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962) (insisting upon the
federalization of principles governing enforcement of arbitration provisions under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, and favoring a uniform body of federal principles, while rejecting
application of conflicting state principles).
160. Pompano-Windy City Partners v. Bear-Steams & Co., 698 F. Supp. 504, 516 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (1994)).
161. 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
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business relationship with the successful party in the arbitration. 62
However, the justices were unable to agree whether the mere "appearance
of bias" would be sufficient to invalidate an award.' 63 The Second
Circuit has rejected both "appearance of bias" and "actual bias"
standards, concluding that the appropriate standard is whether "a
reasonable person would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial
to one party to the arbitration,"'6' based on "inferences from objective
facts inconsistent with partiality." 65 Other courts, insisting on actual
bias, have displayed reluctance to overturn an award on the basis of a
relationship between a party and the arbitrator so long as the relationship
was disclosed."
The fact that Georgeanne's employer has appointed the arbitration
panel-while certainly suggestive of possible bias in a practical sense-isunlikely, by itself, to constitute "evident partiality" within the meaning
of section 10(b). Moreover, even if an award against Georgeanne could
be set aside on that ground, that prospect does little to further her interest
in obtaining redress for the discrimination she claims to have occurred.
Some federal district courts have asserted inherent equitable authority to
reform arbitration agreements that provide for evidently biased arbitrators.' 67 Even if that is so, the Gilmer Court's endorsement of the
relatively one-sided NYSE arbitration procedures in that case poses a
problem for Georgeanne, unless Gilmer can be distinguished on the
ground that it did not involve a typical contract of employment. 6

162. See id. at 147-48.
163. Justice Black, writing for a plurality of four justices, appeared to impose upon arbitrators
ethical standards similar to those applicable to judges, including avoidance of the "appearance of
bias." Id. at 150. Justice White's concurring opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, disclaims such a
standard. See id. (White & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
164. Morelite Constr. Corp. v. New York City Dist. Council, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984)
(finding father-son relationship between arbitrator and principal representative of a party constituted
evident partiality).
165. Pitta v. Hotel Assn. of New York City, Inc., 806 F.2d 419, 423 n.2 (2d Cir. 1986).

166. See, e.g., Woods v. Saturn Distribution Corp., 78 F.3d 424 (9th Cir. 1996); Merit Ins. Co.
v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1983) ("The parties to an arbitration choose their
method of dispute resolution, and can ask no more impartiality than inheres in the method they have
chosen.').
167. Compare Cristina Blouse Corp. v. ILGWU, 492 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (noting that

the arbitrator had acted as attorney for one of the parties), and Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball
Club, 349 F. Supp. 716 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1972) (noting that the
arbitrator was a partner in law firm that represented one of the parties), with In re Dover Steamship,
143 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (noting that the court's power to deal with bias of an arbitrator

under FAA is limited to setting aside the award after it has been rendered).
168. Cf Pompano-Windy City Partners v. Bear-Steams & Co., 698 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (applying criteria used in post-award challenge under section 10(b) of FAA to hold that the
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The conclusion for Georgeanne must be that while it is possible that
federal common law principles or the permissible application of her
state's unconscionability principles would provide her with protection
against at least the more egregious provisions of her arbitration
agreement, there is very little authority upon which she can rely.
Moreover, it does not seem likely that the courts will be receptive to
theories which would open the door to litigation over enforcement of
arbitration agreements generally. If Georgeanne is to succeed in
bypassing arbitration, she must invoke the distinctive character of the
claim she is asserting, and reach beyond the FAA to the principles
contained or implied in the statute which underlies that claim.
C.

What Limitations Do FederalAnti-discrimination Statutes Impose
upon the Enforcement of Pre-disputeArbitrationAgreements?

If the only way in which a plaintiff could invoke an anti-discrimination statute as a defense to enforcement of an arbitration agreement were
to show that Congress intended to "preclude waiver of a judicial forum,"
we could forget about that possibility for Georgeanne. As the Supreme
Court observed in Gilmer, if Congress did not intend to preclude private
parties from settling a discrimination claim without litigation, Congress
surely did not intend to preclude them from settlement through agreement
69
to abide by the decision of a third party.' Indeed, the Americans With
Disabilities Act 170 ("ADA") and Title VII both contain provisions
encouraging resolution of disputes through alternative dispute resolution
("ADR"), including arbitration, "where appropriate and to the extent
authorized by law."' 7 1
But this way of stating the question leaves out the important
differences between the settlement of an existing dispute and an
agreement to submit to arbitration unknown disputes which may arise in
the future. Even the Court's opinion in Wilko implied that the result
of that nature. 72
would have been different if the agreement had been
Once a dispute has arisen, the parties are focused upon the issues and in
a position to assess precisely what is being waived and the probable
effect of the waiver. Their agreement, entered into in the shadow of
plaintiff's allegations of bias against NASD arbitration procedures were too speculative and
attenuated to justify invalidation of the arbitration agreement).
169. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 21 (1991).
170. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
171. Id. §§ 1981, 12212.
172. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430 (1953).
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litigation as an alternative, is far more likely to be the product of true
negotiation. Thus, there is little reason to be concerned, in the case of
such agreements, about either voluntariness or fairness. However the
parties choose to structure their arbitration, unless they agree to
something unlawful, should be up to them. And, while any system of
alternative dispute resolution may detract somewhat from statutory
policies which favor deterrence and the development of a coherent and
uniform body of principles, the impact upon those policies of enforcing
ad hoc agreements to arbitrate is likely to be relatively slight. Therefore,
Congress would have little reason to preclude enforcement of arbitration
agreements relating to existing disputes.
Pre-dispute agreements are of a different nature. Before a dispute
arises, it is impossible for a party to assess precisely what is being
waived and the probable effect of the waiver-even if his or her
attention is focused on the issue. In the employment context this is
especially a problem for the employee; while the employer can take into
account statistical probabilities affecting all its employees, the employee's
ability to predict what may happen to him or her individually is beyond
the scope of such analysis. Moreover, while a post-dispute agreement to
arbitrate is likely to be the product of true negotiations against the
backdrop of threatened litigation, pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate are
far more likely to be part of a package of provisions imposed by the
employer on a take-it-or-leave it basis. Further, while the post-dispute
agreement is individual and ad hoc, the wholesale nature of pre-dispute
agreements applicable to a broad range of employees magnifies their
impact upon the overall implementation of the statutory scheme. If all
employers were to require all employees to enter into pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate discrimination claims, judicial development of the
law, subject to a minuscule number of EEOC lawsuits, would disappear.
If we are to inquire as to the incompatibility of arbitration with particular
statutes, it is pre-dispute agreements that must be the focus of our
attention.
Gilmer, of course, did involve a pre-dispute agreement, but its
holding does not preclude our inquiry.17 That case involved a single
statute, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,1 74 and it is possible that an analysis of other statutes and their legislative history would
yield different results. Even with respect to that statute, the Court
acknowledged that an arbitration agreement could not preclude resort to
173. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 21, 23.
174. See id.
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agency jurisdiction. 7 ' The circumstances of the Gilmer case-the fact
that Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate was not imposed directly by his
employer, Gilmer's relative sophistication, and what the Court perceived
Exchange's arbitration
to be the relative fairness of the New York Stock
76
distinction.
for
grounds
procedures-provide
1. Are Other Statutes Distinguishable from the ADEA?
In deciding Gilmer the Court remanded to the Fifth Circuit, for
reexamination in light of that opinion, a case involving arbitrability,
under NYSE procedures, of sex discrimination claims under Title VII,
and the Fifth Circuit had no difficulty deciding that Gilmer controlled.'77 Other circuits considering that question since have
agreed.'7 8 On that score, things do not look bright for Georgeanne.
There is a plausible argument to be made, however, that the 1991
Civil Rights Act 179 and its legislative history reflect congressional°
intent to preclude enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements.'
Section 118 of the 1991 Act provides: "[w]here appropriate and to the
extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation,
mediation, fact-finding, mini-trials, and arbitration, is encouraged to
resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law
amended by this Act."' 8'
This language derives from identical language in the Civil Rights
Act of 1990,"s which was aborted by presidential veto, and that
language, inturn, was derived from section 513 of the Americans With
Disabilities Act,8 3 which was adopted in the same year.
The bill which became the ADA originated in the Senate, but the
ADR-encouragement provision which became section 513 was added by

175. See id. at 28-29.
176. See id. at 25 n.2, 30-33.
177. See Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
178. See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994); Willis v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229

(5th Cir. 1991).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991).
180. The Fourth Circuit, minimizing the significance of the committee reports, has rejected this
argument. See Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996). A
petition for certiorari to review other aspects of the court's ruling is pending in the Supreme Court.
181. See id.
182. See S.2104, 101st Cong. (1990).
183. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
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amendment in the House."8 The May 15, 1990 report of the House
Judiciary Committee states:
This amendment was adopted to encourage alternative means of dispute
resolution that are already authorized by law. The Committee wishes
to emphasize, however, that the use of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms is intended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies
provided by this Act. Thus, for example, the Committee believes that
any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration,whether in the
context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an employment
contract, does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief
under the enforcement provisions of this Act. This view is consistent
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, whose remedial provisions are incorporated by reference
in Title I. The Committee believes that the approach articulated by the
Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo. applies equally to
the ADA and does not intend that the inclusion of Section 513 be used
that would otherwise be available to
to preclude rights and remedies
85
persons with disabilities.
offered the amendment, echoed this
Congressman Glickman, who
86
position on the House floor.1
The Conference Committee, where the difference between the House
version and the Senate version of the bill was resolved in favor of
retaining section 513, issued a report which adopted by reference the
statement of the House Judiciary Committee regarding that provision and
added the following declaration: "[i]t is the intent of the conferees that
the use of these alternative dispute resolution procedures is completely
voluntary. Under no condition would an arbitrationclause in a collective
prevent an individualfrom
bargainingcontract or employment contract
187
ADA."'
the
under
rights
pursuing their
These committee reports were written approximately one year before
Gilmer was decided. While it is possible to read the House Judiciary

184. See H.R. REP.No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 76 (1990).
185. Id. at 76-77 (emphasis added).
186. Specifically, Rep. Glickman stated:
I want to make it very clear that the use of alternative dispute resolution procedures, such
as settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-finding, minitrials, and
arbitration, is completely voluntary. Just to clear up any confusion there might be, under

no condition would an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement or
employment contract prevent an individual from pursuing their rights under the ADA.
136 CoNG. Rc. H2431-02 (daily ed. May 17, 1990).
187. H.R. CoNF.REP. 101-596, at 89 (1990) (emphasis added).
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Committee report as merely a statement of what the committee "believed" to then be existing law as to the effect of an arbitration clause in
a collective bargaining agreement or employment contract, 8 such a
reading assumes that the drafters were indifferent to that effect, and that
does not seem likely. In any event, the Conference Committee report
expresses more than a belief; it states the intent of the conferees with
respect to the proper scope of arbitration and other dispute resolution
procedures.' 89 On their face, therefore, the committee reports provide a
substantial basis for the argument that the Congress which enacted the
ADA thought the policies of that statute would be undermined by
precluding judicial enforcement on the190basis of a pre-dispute agreement
contained in an employment contract.
The legislative history underlying section 118 of the aborted Civil
Rights Act of 1990 parallels the history of ADA section 513. Section 118
was added to the bill by amendment in the House Judiciary Committee
in July, 1990, two months after passage of the ADA.1 91 The report of
that Committee acknowledges that a "virtually identical amendment was
enacted as part of the Americans With Disabilities Act," and proceeds to
state its understanding with respect to the meaning of the language in the
identical terms the same Committee used earlier with respect to ADA
section 513.92

188. This was the position of the New York Court of Appeals in Fletcherv. Kidder Peabody
& Co., 619 N.E.2d 998, 1003 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that committee reports merely set forth the
committee's understanding of existing precedents).
189. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 76-77.
190. See Devlin v. Arizona Youth Soccer Assoc., 5 AD Cases (BNA) 321, 321-22 (D.C. Ariz.
Feb. 8, 1996); cf Golenia v. Bob Baker Toyota, 915 F. Supp. 201, 205 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (holding
that the ADA does not impose a higher standard of waiver than is ordinarily applicable to arbitration
agreements).
191. See H.R. REP. No. 101-644, pt. 2, at 47 (1990).
192. Specifically it states:
The Committee emphasizes, however, that the use of alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms is intended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by Title VII.
Thus, for example, the Committee believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues
to arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an
employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the
enforcement provisions of Title VII. This view is consistent with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of Title VII in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The
Committee does not intend for the inclusion of this section be used to preclude rights and
remedies that would otherwise be available.
Id. at 47-48.
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Again in conference the Senate acceded to the House language, and
the Conference Committee reiterated the gloss provided by the House
Judiciary Committee. 3
Following President Bush's veto, the aborted Civil Rights Act of
1990 was reintroduced as House Report 1.194 That bill, which contained
dispute resolution language identical to the comparable provision of the
vetoed statute, was referred jointly to the House Judiciary Committee and
5
the House Committee on Education and Labor. On April 24, 1991,
196
that Committee issued a report which characterized the provision
(now section 216) as follows:
Section 216 encourages the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution to resolve disputes arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
42 U.S.C. § 1981, or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 621 et. seq., where appropriate and to the extent authorized
by law. These methods include settlement negotiations, conciliation,
facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials and arbitration. This
section is intended to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution
that are already authorized by law.
The Committee emphasizes, however, that the use of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms is intended to supplement, not supplant,
the remedies provided by Title VII. Thus, for example, the Committee
believes that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration,
whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an
employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from
seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII. This view
is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Alexander v.
Gardner-DenverCo.'97

193. It states:
The Conferees emphasize, that the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is
intended to supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by Title VII. Thus, for
example, the Conferees believe that any agreement to submit disputed issues to
arbitration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an
employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under the
enforcement provisions of Title VII. This view is consistent with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of Title VII in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). The
Conferees do not intend this section to be used to preclude rights and remedies that
would otherwise be available.
H.R. REP. No. 101-856, pt. 2, at 26 (1990).
194. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 124, 133 (1994).
195. See id. at 1.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 97.
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In addition to this characterization of the language contained in
House Report 1, the Committee's report states that at the markup of the
bill the Committee "considered and rejected by voice vote an amendment
in the nature of a substitute," based upon a proposal by the Bush
administration.19 8 With regards to the issue of dispute resolution, the
Committee report states that unlike section 216 of House Report 1,
which:
includes a provision encouraging the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution to supplement rather than supplant the rights and remedies
provided by Title VII,... [the Republican proposal] encourages the
use of such mechanisms "in place of judicial resolution." Thus under
the latter proposal employers could refuse to hire workers unless they
signed a binding statement waiving all rights to file Title VII complaints. Such a rule would fly in the face of Supreme Court decisions
holding that workers have the right to go to court, rather than being
forced into compulsory arbitration, to resolve important statutory and
constitutional rights, including employment opportunity rights. See, e.g.,
Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); McDonald v.
City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984). American workers should
not be forced to choose between their jobs and their civil rights. 199
It must be acknowledged that certain aspects of the legislative
history underlying the dispute resolution provisions of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act render it somewhat less definitive than the comparable
legislative history underlying those provisions of the ADA. Section 216
of the Act does not by its terms amend Title VII, or any other statute; it
stands as an independent provision encouraging the use of dispute
resolution, not only with respect to Title VII, but also with respect to
other statutes affected by the 1991 Act. These statutes include (as the
Committee report states) section 1981 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act considered (on the basis of a record which did not
include section 216) in Gilmer itself.0 0 When the Supreme Court
decided Gilmer- subsequent to the report of the Labor and Employment
Committee, but prior to the passage of the statute-there was no
legislative reaction to that decision, presumably because by that time the

198. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1,at 97 (1991).
199. Id. at 104; cf H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 156 (1991) (stating that the Republican bill,
H.R. 102-1375 "specifically provide[d] that any agreement to such a mechanism must be 'knowing
and voluntary."').
200. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, at 97.
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deal had been struck on a compromise bill which no one was motivated
to upset.2°' Instead, legislators attempted, as usual, to make legislative
history on both sides of the issue. 2
Nonetheless, and disregarding expressions from the floor, the
continuity of legislative intent as expressed in committee hearings
underlying both the ADA and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides
powerful support for an argument that if plaintiffs cannot be barred from
judicial recourse under the ADA by a provision for arbitration contained
in an employment agreement, they cannot be barred from judicial
recourse under the statutes affected by the 1991 Act-or at least (since
it was singled out in the 1991 Committee report) under Title VII.
In the case of Title VII, such an argument is bolstered by the nature
of the amendments which were made to the statute through the 1991 Act,
20 3
and particularly by the provisions for damages and jury trial. While
it is possible that Congress contemplated that the newly created right to
jury trial could be waived by a pre-dispute provision in an employment
contract, such an assumption seems less plausible than the one reflected
in the express language of the various committee reports that considered
the issue. This is especially so in light of the constitutional considerations
discussed in the following section.

201. See 137 CONG. REC. S15472 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole).
202. Senator Dole authored a memorandum expressing the views of the Administration and
several other Senators with respect to the-compromise bill. See id. That memorandum explains the
dispute resolution provision as
"encourag[ing] the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including binding
arbitration, where the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect to use these methods. In
light of the litigation crisis facing the country and the increasing sophistication and
reliability of alternatives to litigation, there is no reason to disfavor the use of such
forums. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991)."
Id. at S 15478. The implication is that the agreement enforced in Gilmer,though obviously a condition of employment, was nevertheless knowing and voluntary.
A week later, Congressman Edwards, a Democrat from California, authored a countermemorandum interpreting the compromise bill. 137 CoNG. REC. H9526 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991).
That memorandum, which reiterates the language of the Committee report, states: "No approval
whatsoever is intended of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Gilbert [sic] v. InterstateJohnson
Lane Corp., 111 S.Ct. 1647 (1991), or any application or extension of it to Title VII. See id.This
section is virtually identical to section 216 in House Report 1 as previously passed by the House in
this Congress and as explained in H.R. Rep. No. 102-40, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1991)." 137
CONG. REC. at H9530.
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)-(c) (1994). The EEOC has offered this argument to the courts,
but so far has been rebuffed. See, eag., Johnson v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447 (D.
Minn. 1996).
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2. Must Waiver Be "Knowing and Voluntary"?
Short of reading the employment-related statutes to preclude
enforcement of all pre-dispute waivers of a judicial forum, they may be
read to require at least that the waiver be both knowing and voluntary.
There are, as noted, portions of the legislative history underlying both the
ADA and the 1991 amendment to Title VII which contain language to
that effect.2" The implication of such a requirement, aimed at assuring
meaningful bargaining and choice surrounding the waiver of statutory
procedures and the design of their replacement, may well be considered
a necessary prophylactic against the unilateral imposition of arbitration
procedures which would otherwise tend to defeat the policy objectives of
the respective statutes.
Moreover, insistence that waiver be both knowing and voluntary
may be particularly appropriate when what the employee is relinquishing
the right to trial by jury on a claim for which a jury trial would be not
only statutorily but constitutionally required. Presumably, this is the case
regarding claims for compensatory or punitive damages under either the
ADA or the 1991 amendments to Title VII. Under such circumstances,
for the government to insist upon enforcement of a waiver without regard
to whether it was knowing or voluntary would appear to raise serious
constitutional issues. °5
A requirement that waiver be at least "knowing" has already been
read into Title VII by the Ninth Circuit. In PrudentialInsurance Co. v.
Lai,"6 the court found in the text and history of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act a congressional intent that "there ...be at least a knowing
agreement to arbitrate employment disputes before an employee may be
204. See 137 CONG. REC. S15472 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991); 137 CONG. REC. H9526 (daily ed.
Nov. 7, 1991).
205. See National Equip. Rental v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding
contractual provision not effective for waiver of jury trial where contract is one of adhesion with
gross inequality of bargaining power); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755-56 (6th
Cir. 1985) (holding waiver of jury trial right subject to knowing and voluntary standard); Dreiling
v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 539 F. Supp. 401, 403 (D. Colo. 1982) (stating that strong
presumption in favor ofjury trial deems that waiver will only be considered valid if done knowingly
and intentionally); cf.Nghiem v. NEC Elecs., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.dented,
115 S. Ct. 635 (1994) (rejecting the argument that establishment of jury trial right for Title VII
claims evinced a congressional intent to preclude arbitration). But see Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, 961
F.2d 1148, 1155 n.12 (5th Cir. 1992); 9 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2321 (2d ed. 1995) ("A contractual provision for waiver of jury will
be enforced, but it will be strictly construed.").

206. 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 61 (1995).
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deemed to have waived the comprehensive statutory rights, remedies, and
procedural protections prescribed in Title VII and related state statutes."2 7 On that basis, the court concluded that plaintiffs could proceed
with their state law sexual harassment claims, notwithstanding a
provision in their employment application forms which called for
arbitration of "any dispute, claim or controversy that is required to be
arbitrated under the rules.., of the organizations with which I
register."20 8 Plaintiffs, required to register with the National Association
09
relevant rules,2
of Securities Dealers, were not provided a copy of the
and in any event the rules, which called for arbitration of disputes
business" of its members, made no
"arising in connection with the 210
disputes.
employment
to
reference
But, a requirement of knowing waiver in these terms is also rather
easily met2 and by itself does little to assure that an arbitration
agreement will be the product of meaningful choice. Unless the law is
prepared to say that the waiver must be voluntary as well as knowing,
little will be accomplished. At this'point, however, we encounter a
problem with thorny philosophical and practical dimensions. Voluntariness, the economists will tell us, is present in any agreement, short of the
sorts of coercion we are prepared to recognize as amounting to duress.
The fact that Georgeanne might not have been able to find any employment that did not require her to sign a similar arbitration agreement
economic
would no more satisfy the economists than the press of similar
New York.212
v.
Lochner
in
court
the
satisfied
circumstances

207. Id. at 1304.
208. Id. at 1302.

209. See id. at 1303.
210. Id. at 1302-03. The court emphasized the particular significance for sexual harassment cases
of differences likely to exist between judicial and arbitral fora, noting that, "in an area as personal
and emotionally charged as sexual harassment and discrimination, the procedural right to a hearing
before a jury of one's peers, rather than a panel of the National Association of Securities Dealers,
may be especially important." Id. at 1305 n.4. The court referred also to the protections afforded by

California law for the privacy rights of victims of sexual harassment. See id. at 1305.

211. The NASD "U-4" form, at issue in Lai, has since been modified. See Uniform Application
for Securities Industby Registration or Transfer,Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 5118 (1996). The Ninth

Circuit has since enforced arbitration under the new rule. See Kuehner v. Dickinson & Co., 84 F.3d
316, 320-21 (9th Cir. 1996); cf.Berger v. Cantor Fitzgerald Sec., No. 96 CIV. 2836 (SAS), 1996

WL 640888, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1996) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on his contention that he was misled as to the nature of the U-4 clause, and was given no

more than five minutes to complete the application form).
212. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1996

37

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 1
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 14:1

The truth is that "voluntariness" is a matter of degree in any context,
and the characterization is inevitably normative.213 To say that an
agreement someone has signed is "involuntary" is to say that it is
accompanied by a degree of pressure, economic or otherwise, which
creates risks of unfairness or infringement upon public values that under
the circumstances society is not prepared to accept. The question is
whether our society has said that with respect to the employment statutes,
and if so with respect to what circumstances.
One answer would be to say that any waiver of access to a judicial
forum that an employer imposes as a condition of employment, or of
continued employment (or, perhaps, as a condition of receiving any
benefit of employment), is not "voluntary" for purposes of the federal
statutes." 4 Gilmer does not necessarily preclude that answer, because
25
Gilmer's arbitration agreement was not imposed by his employer. '
Rather, it was required by law as a condition of doing the sort of work
Gilmer was hired to do.2 16 The distinction is meaningful because
imposition of a requirement by operation of law does not entail the same
potential for abuse as the imposition of the same requirement by an
employer seeking to minimize its legal exposure. Such a position would
be vulnerable in marginal cases. Perhaps an arbitration agreement entered
into willingly by a sought-after corporate executive officer should be
enforced even if the company insists upon it, and perhaps companies
should be permitted to "bargain" with employees by offering incentives
to enter into arbitration agreements, but it does have the advantage of
providing a bright-line rule that would likely avoid the more egregious
use of power to obtain undue advantage.
If the courts are to be brought to such a position, agency guidance
would be useful. In 1995, the EEOC issued a policy statement declaring
the Commission's, "belie[f] that parties must knowingly, willingly and

213. See Stephen J.Ware, EmploymentArbitrationand Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
(forthcoming fall 1996). Professor Ware suggests that voluntariness can be defined only by reference
to a "baseline" of rights specified by non-contract law. See id. If the "baseline" includes the policies
of the anti-discrimination laws discussed herein, I would agree.
214. Bills that would expressly prohibit employers from requiring employees to arbitrate
discrimination claims as a condition of employment have been introduced in Congress, but have not
been enacted into law. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S12101 (daily ed. Aug. 18, 1994) (statement of
Sen. Feingold); 140 CONG. REC. H8595 (daily ed. Aug. 17, 1994) (statement of Rep. Schroeder);
140 CONG. REc. S4266 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1994) (statement of Sen. Feingold).
215. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991).
216. See id.
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voluntarily enter into an ADR proceeding," ' 7 but the statement was
not accompanied by explanation or legal analysis. In the same year, the
EEOC took the position in litigation that an employer's insistence upon
arbitration agreements as a condition of employment was itself a
violation of Title VII, but the foundation for its position-whether that
was because the agreements in question purported to preclude the filing
of charges with the agency itself, or perhaps because the requirement was
in retaliation for activity protected under the statute-was ambiguous."' A long-awaited clarification by the EEOC has yet to appear.
Realistically, there is not much solace in all of this for Georgeanne.
Her agreement did make reference to statutory claims in a way likely to
satisfy the Ninth Circuit, and if courts can eventually be brought to
withhold enforcement from pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate such
claims, or from those which are not in some sense truly voluntary, they
seem a long way from doing that. Georgeanne's best chances of avoiding
arbitration, or of limiting her risks, may lie in combining her argument
based upon the involuntariness of her agreement with arguments directed
at those aspects of her arbitration agreement which arguably offend the
policies reflected in the federal anti-discrimination laws.
3.

Limits on What Can be Waived Through a Pre-dispute Agreement

Once a dispute has arisen, the parties (in the absence of a class
action) are free to settle that dispute on any terms they negotiate, so long
as those terms are not themselves unlawful, and presumably they may do
so through an arbitration agreement which allows the arbitrator to reach
any conclusions that the parties themselves would have been free to
accept. Since, for example, the parties are free to settle for whatever
amount the plaintiff is willing to accept, nothing prevents the parties
from submitting their dispute to an arbitrator with a stipulation that the
award may not exceed a specified amount, or that the arbitrator may not

217. Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute Resolution or Coercive

Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. 131, 140 n.49 (1996) (citation omitted).

218. See EEOC v. River Oaks Imaging & Diagnostic, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1243

(S.D. Tex. 1995); Hoffman, supra note 217, at 135. After 2 women who declined to sign a
mandatory arbitration agreement were discharged, the EEOC challenged the unilateral imposition by
employers of mandatory alternative dispute resolution policies. See Hoffman, supranote 217, at 139.
In April the court issued a preliminary injunction. See Hoffman, supra note 217, at 139. In June, the
case was resolved by consent order, permanently revoking ROID's alternative dispute resolution
policy. See Hoffman, supra note 217, at 140.
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award reinstatement, or whatever other conditions they consider
appropriate.
But in Alexander, the Court, in dealing with Title VII, found it
"clear that there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's
rights." 2 9 While Gilmer rejected Alexander's premise that these rights
included the right to a judicial forum, the Court did not otherwise
question that premise? 0o We can assume, therefore, that a distinction
continues to exist, with respect to what is waivable, between a postdispute agreement to arbitrate and a pre-dispute agreement. Perhaps
further distinctions need to be drawn among pre-dispute agreements with
respect to the circumstances, or the degree of voluntariness, but if that is
so the case law to date provides scant guidance.
a.

Access to a Federal Agency

One right which is apparently non-waivable, according to the Gilmer
Court, is the right of access to a federal agency with jurisdiction to
enforce the federal statute under which the employee's claim is
made.221 Responding to Gilmer's contention that arbitration would
undermine the role of the EEOC in enforcing the Al EA, the Court
declared, without explanation, that "[a]n individual ADEA claimant
subject to an arbitration agreement will still be free to file a charge with
the EEOC."2" Presumably the explanation for this proposition lies in
the Court's interpretation of the ADEA, and implies that were that
proposition not correct Gilmer's contention would have greater merit. 3
Assuming the ADEA is indistinguishable from Title VII with respect to
this issue, we may conclude that Georgeane's agreement to arbitrate is
not enforceable to the extent that it purports to waive her right to file a
charge with the EEOC.
It would seem likely also'that the existence of Georgeanne's
arbitration agreement would not affect the statutory jurisdiction of the
EEOC to bring suit on her behalf if it deems such action appropriate-particularly since, as the Gilmer Court observed, EEOC jurisdiction
is not dependent upon the filing of a charge." 4 The Gilmer opinion
does not address that issue directly, but in response to Gilmer's argument
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
See id. at 28.
Id.
See id.
See id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol14/iss1/1

40

Grodin: Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Pol
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims

1996]

that arbitration is an inadequate substitute for litigation because of the
inability to pursue class actions the court stated (again without analysis),
"it should be remembered that arbitration agreements will not preclude
the EEOC from bringing actions seeking class-wide and equitable
While it is perhaps arguable that an individual action, not
relief."
involving class-wide or equitable relief, is distinguishable, such an
argument ought not prevail in the face of clear statutory language.
b.

Substantive Rights Under Federal Law

The Gilmer Court also reiterated the Mitsubishi Motors distinction
between a waiver of the right to a judicial forum and a waiver of
6
"substantive rights" under a particular statute. 2 Presumably an
arbitration agreement could not validly direct an arbitrator to apply
substantive rules of liability different from those which the statute
mandates-to rule for the employer in a sexual harassment case, for
example, unless the arbitrator found that the employer knowingly
arranged for the employee to be harassed. But, short of that, what is to
be said of arbitration agreements, such as Georgeanne's, which purport
to shorten the statutory period of limitations, or to limit the remedies
otherwise available under the statute?
In Graham Oil Co. v. Arco Products Co.,2 7 the Ninth Circuit held
that a franchisee under a distributorship agreement covered by the
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act could sue under that statute notwith22
standing arbitration provisions contained in the agreement. 1 Those
provisions purported to establish a shorter period of limitations than the
statute, and to preclude exemplary damages and attorney fees which the
statute authorized. 9 Rather than excise the offensive provisions, the
court characterizing them as parts of an integrated scheme to circumvent
23°
public policy, held the entire arbitration clause invalid.
While Graham Oil rests on an interpretation of a statute pertaining
to franchise relationships, 231 its reasoning would appear equally
applicable to federal employment discrimination statutes. It suggests that
those portions of Georgeanne's arbitration agreement, which purport to

225. Id. at 32.

226. See id. at 29.
227. 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 275 (1995).

228.
229.
230.
231.

See id. at
See id. at
See id. at
See id. at

1246-47.
1247-48.
1249.
1247.
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shorten the period of limitations and limit the relief available, are not
only invalid, but provide grounds for invalidating the entire agreement.23 As Georgeanne's lawyers, we must be cautious in this conclusion. A federal district court, without citing to Graham Oil, has
concluded that an agreement to arbitrate discrimination claims is
enforceable even though it precludes punitive damages, attorney fees, and
equitable relief.233 Moreover, Georgeanne's arbitration agreement,
unlike the agreement in Graham Oil, contains a severability clause. We
can at least be cautiously optimistic that if we go to arbitration the
arbitrator can be persuaded to ignore these restrictive provisions or, if we
are prepared to litigate, that a court can be persuaded to strike them

down.
c.

Rights to Fair and Effective Procedures

Representatives of the American Bar Association and of various
private organizations which provide or sponsor ADR services have
recognized the problems of fairness which may arise in connection with
arbitration under agreements similar to those used in Gilmer, and have
joined in the Due Process Protocolfor Mediation and Arbitration of
234
Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship
2
5
ArbitraAmerican
recommending certain procedural safeguards. The
tion Association in its California operations and JAMS-Endispute, an
organization providing ADR services through retired judges, have
adopted special rules governing such arbitrations. 36 Such actions are
232. See id. at 1248-49.
233. See DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1613, 1996 WL 44226, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 5, 1996); see also Johnson v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 1447 (D. Minn. 1996)
(holding that plaintiff was bound to arbitrate her discrimination claims under an agreement that
required notice of demand for arbitration period within a shorter period than allowed under
applicable federal and state law, limited the arbitrator's award out to out-of-pocket expenses, and
provided that each party would be reasonable for its own costs and attorney fees regardless of the
award. The magistrate's opinion upon which the court's order was based acknowledged that if they
were applied to limit plaintiff's access to a tribunal or to remedies beyond the limitations of
applicable law, these provisions would be invalid, but in effect ruled that plaintiff's arguments on
these grounds premature).
234. Disp. REs. J. Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 37 [hereinafter Due ProcessProtocol]. This document was
signed on May 9, 1995 by representatives of the National Academy of Arbitrators, the Society of
Professional in Dispute Resolution, the American Arbitration Association, and Council officers of
the Labor & Employment Section of the American Bar Association, as well as the American Civil
Liberties Union and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. See id.
235. See id.
236. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION
RuLES (1995).
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likely to have considerable influence on the way in which employers
structure their arbitration procedures. But the protocol and the special
rules are not law, and even if, as in the case of JAMS-Endispute, an
ADR provider insists that it will not handle arbitrations except pursuant
to the special rules there is nothing to prevent an employer, such as in
Hazard Insurance from going its own way. The question remains,
whether there is any legal basis for insisting that pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in the employment context conform to any requirements of
fairness or effectiveness in implementing the policies of the federal
statutes.
Interpreting the federal anti-discrimination statutes to impose such
requirements would seem like a logical extrapolation from the existence
of the statutes and the policies they reflect. Gilmer appears to leave the
door open to such an interpretation, at least with respect to arbitration
programs less protective of fairness and effectiveness than the NYSE
arbitration procedures."3 7 But, if that is the case, what specific safeguards would such an interpretation require?
i.

Procedures Related to Selection of Arbitrator

At a minimum, it would seem that a requirement for fair and
effective procedures should preclude an employer from unilaterally
designating the arbitrator or the arbitral panel. This is true even if the
persons designated bear no particular relationship to the employer, and
have established reputations as independent neutrals. The very fact that
they owe their status to the employer and inferentially to his continuing
satisfaction with them should be sufficient basis for disqualification.
When the arbitrator is selected on a bilateral basis, through the
auspices of a private dispute resolution agency such as the American
Arbitration Association, problems of unfairness in the selection procedure
are more subtle. The employer, as a more frequent user of the system,
has two potential advantages over individual employees; (1) the employer
is more likely to have information about the past decisions and proclivities of particular arbitrators; and (2) the chosen arbitrator will be aware
that his future employment may depend to a greater extent upon an
outcome that does not displease the employer community. I do not mean
to suggest that responsible arbitrators will consciously slant their decision

237. Professor Gorman has made this argument quite forcefully. See Robert A. Gorman, The

Gilmer Decision and the PrivateArbitration of Public-Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 635, 645

(1995).
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for such reasons, but the potential for unconscious bias toward the
employer's position, or perhaps toward the inoffensive middle ground (as
when it comes to assessing claims for punitive damages) is another
matter.
To some extent these problems can be alleviated by making
information about the arbitrator readily available to both parties, and by
the involvement and networking of plaintiffs' lawyers, 3 8 but both these
alleviating factors depend upon activities that may or may not occur.
Their success in eliminating the institutional slant of traditional
arbitration procedures is likely to depend upon the organization and
effectiveness of the plaintiffs' bar in particular areas, and the extent to
which individual claimants, confronted with a unilaterally imposed
arbitration system, in fact have access to a lawyer who will provide the
necessary advice. If a level playing field is to be assured, governmental
involvement in the selection
of panels and in the designation of
219
necessary.
be
may
arbitrators
ii.

Elimination of Unreasonable Financial Barriers

From a purist's perspective, any requirement that a complainant pay
money as a condition of access to a tribunal beyond what would be
required for the filing of a complaint in court, should be viewed as
invalid because it imposes burdens upon the vindication of statutory
rights that would not otherwise exist under the statutory scheme. Perhaps
that perspective needs to be modified to take into account the likelihood
that litigation would entail the risk of greater costs that the employee
might end up paying if she loses, and the added problems of potential
bias that would exist if the arbitrator's fees were paid entirely by the
employer. Even subject to those qualifications, it seems that there must
be some limits placed upon the liability of employees for access and
costs if arbitration is to provide a meaningful alternative for the

238. See Samuel Estreicher, ArbitrationofEmployment Disputes Without Unions,66 CHI.-KENT

L. REv. 753, 765 (1990).
239. In addition, both fairness and the public interest in the implementation of public norms
require that arbitrators be knowledgeable with respect to employment discrimination laws and their
interpretation. The Due Process Protocol recognizes that the, "existing cadre of labor and
employment mediators and arbitrators, some lawyers, some not-athough skilled in conducting
hearings and familiar with the employment milieu-is unlikely, without special training, to
consistently possess knowledge of the statutory environment in which these disputes arise and of the
characteristics of the non-union workplace." Due Process Protocol, supra note 234, at 38. It
recommends reexamination of roster eligibility by designating agencies, and training programs aimed
at providing the necessary skills. Due Process Protocol,supra note 234, at 38.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol14/iss1/1

44

Grodin: Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Pol
1996]

Arbitration of Employment DiscriminationClaims

vindication of statutory policy. Whether and how courts will recognize
that remains to be seen.
iii. Right to Counsel
Absent knowing and voluntary waiver, the right to representation by
counsel in arbitration would seem essential both in terms of fairness and
in terms of effectuating the public goals reflected in the employment
discrimination statutes. The basis for such a right might be found in
common law due process doctrine, but in any event, should be implicit
in the statutes themselves, which provide not only for counsel but for the
recovery of counsel's fees when the plaintiff prevails. Again, however,
the establishment and vindication of such a right will require Georgeanne
to make new law.
iv. Class Actions or Consolidated Proceedings
While the facts in Georgeanne's case may not present the issue,
there are certain employment discrimination cases-pattern or practice
cases and some disparate impact cases, for example-in which the
ability to proceed on a class-wide basis is especially important to the
vindication of statutory rights. Even Georgeanne's case might be
strengthened and facilitated by the ability to join, as claimants, other
women complaining of sexual harassment. Arbitration rules and
agreements do not typically provide for either class actions or consolidated proceedings, however, as far as the FAA is concerned, that may mean
that a court lacks authority to order arbitration to proceed on a class-wide
or consolidated basis.24 The rules of the New York Stock Exchange
24' 1 and the
involved in Gilmer did allow for "collective proceedings,"

240. In Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), the California Supreme Court
held that under the California Arbitration Act, courts have authority to order arbitration proceedings
on a class-wide basis and to supervise the proceedings to safeguard the rights of absent class
members. See id. at 1209. The United States Supreme Court, reversing on other grounds, declined
to pass upon this aspect of the state court's decision. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984). The issue under the FAA remains open. See Stephen H. Kupperman & George C. Freeman,
Selected°Topics in Securities Regulations, 65 TULANE L. REV. 1547, 1577-93 (1991). Compare
Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d. 269 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding as disruptive a consolidation
order where the parties agreement makes no mention of class arbitration), with New England Energy,
Inc. v. Keystone Shipping Co., 855 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that a consolidation order
pursuant to state statute when the contract is silent on the subject is not an improper modification
of the agreement).
241. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991).
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Court relied in part upon that fact in rejecting Gilmer's complaint that
arbitration was an inadequate substitute for litigation;24 but the opinion
proceeds to minimize the significance of the complaint by observing that
the EEOC could, in any event, bring actions seeking class-wide relief, so
that the prospects of distinguishing Gilmer on that ground are not
bright.243 It may be that, as a matter of policy, it would be preferable
to deny arbitration in cases where class actions would be appropriate,
rather than attempt to structure arbitration in a class-wide mode.2'
However, at the present time it does not appear that either alternative is
likely under the FAA.
v. Right to a Record or Statement of Reasons and to Meaningful
Judicial Review
The grounds for judicial review of an arbitration award under the
FAA are extremely limited.245 While some courts have recognized nonstatutory exceptions to arbitral finality, such as "manifest disregard of the
law," these exceptions appear to be quite limited.246 While dicta in
some of the cases suggests that the Supreme Court may be willing to

242. See id. at 30.
at 32.
243. See id.
244. See Kupperman & Freeman, supra note 238, at 1592 (stating courts should refrain from
imposing class actions on the arbitral process).
245. See9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994) (permitting judicial review of any award procured by "corruption,
fraud, or undue means," arbitrator misconduct, or exceeded authority).
246. In addition to the "manifest disregard" standard, some courts have expressed willingness
to vacate an arbitration award which is found to be "arbitrary and capricious" or "completely
irrational," or contrary to "public policy," or (in the case of wayward contract interpretation),
contrary to the "essence of the agreement." See, e.g., M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 87
F.3d 844, 850 (6th cir. 1996) (acknowledging existence of the "manifest disregard of the law"
standard, and stating that an award should be vacated only where the error is obvious and readily
apparent to the average person qualified to be an arbitrator); United Food & Commercial Workers
Int'l Union v. Foster Poultry Farm, 74 F.3d 169, 173 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that a reviewing court
is "extremely limited" in its review of arbitration decisions, upholding them so long as the solution
can be "rationally derived" from a plausible reading of the agreement); French v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 784 F.2d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1072) (finding that an arbitration decision
must be upheld unless it is "completely irrational").
Some courts that have adopted the "manifest disregard" standard, insist that it applies only
when it is apparent from the award that the arbitrator was aware of the law and deliberately
disregarded it. See, e.g., Health Servs. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1153, 1267 (7th Cir. 1992);
Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1985). One federal district court has
concluded that under the Second Circuit's position an award withholding attoney's fees from a
successful plaintiff should be enforced even though the applicable statute- in that case the
ADEA- clearly mandates that such fees should be awarded. See DiRussa v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 936 F. Supp. 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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entertain a broader scope of review in cases involving arbitration of
statutory claims,247 that suggestion has yet to materialize.
Viewed by itself, the traditional rule of arbitral finality might be
considered a neutral principle, favoring neither the employer nor the
employee with respect to employment discrimination claims, and relevant
only to the abstract public interest in assuring the uniform application of
the laws. If the employer and employee each have a fair shot at
persuading a neutral and competent arbitrator, they can be said to have
an equal interest (pre-award) in assuring that the award is not subject to
further litigation. Considered in the light of the various factors which
may otherwise slant arbitration in favor of the employer's interests,
however, the situation is quite different; to the extent that the deck is
stacked against the employee with respect to arbitral selection or
procedures, a rule which insulates the award from judicial review is
hardly neutral. If arbitration of discrimination claims is to be permitted
on the basis of adhesive agreements, then considerations of both public
policy and fairness to plaintiffs argue in favor of meaningful judicial
review.
But if there is to be meaningful review, there must be an adequate
basis for review-either a record of the proceedings or, at a minimum,
a statement by the arbitrator which reflects his or her factual findings and
legal analysis. Again, Gilmer need not be read to preclude such a
requirement.
d. Rights Under State Law
Although the Supreme Court has found the FAA to contain a broad
preemption principle, requiring states to enforce agreements to arbitrate
that would be enforceable under federal law, nothing in case law suggests
that principle would require states to accede to modifications in their
substantive law or policies simply because those modifications are
contained in agreements to arbitrate. Thus, the Supreme Court's
distinction between waiver of the judicial forum and waiver of substantive rights, as declared in Gilmer and as explicated in Graham Oil
(assuming that explication to be valid) should apply equally to claims
247. In Shearson/AmericanExpress, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), the Court stated,

"although judicial scrutiny of arbitration awards necessarily is limited, such review is sufficient to
ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute." Id. at 232. In Gilmer,the Court

reiterated that cryptic language in response to Gilmer's argument that the limited scope of judicial
review made arbitration an inappropriate vehicle for the implementation of'public norms. See Gilmer,
500 U.S. at 32 n.4.
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under state law. As a consequence, if the provisions of Georgeanne's
arbitration agreement are invalid insofar as they purport to waive the
statute of limitations and remedies available under federal law, they
should be invalid, as they purport to waive the statute of limitations and
remedies available under state law as well.
The question of Georgeanne's access to the state agency charged
with responsibility for administering the state's anti-discrimination law
is a bit different. As a result of Southland and Perry we know that under
FAA general preemption principles, a state cannot insist upon the
availability of a judicial forum for enforcement of state statutory rights
in the face of an arbitration agreement that is subject to the FAA, so that
(subject to other possible defenses to the arbitration clause) Georgeanne
will not be permitted to sue under her state's anti-discrimination law. The
reasoning of those cases would seem to apply equally to an administrative forum. For example, if the plaintiff's arbitration agreement in Perry
precluded him from suing in court to obtain wages due, presumably it
would have precluded him from invoking the jurisdiction of the State
Labor Commissioner as well.
This would seem to be the case with any state law claim unless
some statute other than the FAA calls for a different result. If Georgeanne's claim were for violation of a state law prohibiting discrimination on
grounds which lie outside the scope of federal anti-discrimination
laws-such as sexual orientation, or whistle-blowing-and if her
arbitration agreement were otherwise enforceable, federal preemption
principles would appear to require her to arbitrate rather than litigate her
claim before either a state court or a state agency. The same would be
true of claims under other state laws, such as those regulating wages or
conditions of employment.
But in the case of Title VII, Congress has made state laws and state
agencies an integral part of federal anti-discrimination policy. Indeed,
Georgeanne's complaint to her state agency is a statutory precondition to
her filing with the EEOC. If Georgeanne cannot be precluded from filing
with the EEOC, it should follow that she cannot be precluded from filing
with her state agency either.
Does this mean that the state agency would be free to exercise the
full scope of its jurisdiction under state law, even if that entails remedial
authority-the holding of hearings and the issuance of judicially
enforceable orders, perhaps including orders for compensatory damages
and administrative fines-that the EEOC does not have? While that
result might be contrary to the expectations of Georgeanne's employer
when it insisted upon the agreement to arbitrate, it is not a result
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markedly different from the scenario contemplated by the Supreme Court
in Gilmer, in which the EEOC exercises its authority to bring a lawsuit
on the complainant's behalf. In light of Title VI's general blessing for
state laws and agencies, we should conclude-albeit tentatively-that
state agency proceedings remain a possibility for Georgeanne, whatever
other consequences flow from her arbitration agreement. Of course, if her
state's agency has only the power to investigate and conciliate, like the
EEOC, that will not be much of an asset.
e.

Advice to Georgeanne

On the basis of this survey of existing doctrine, we should probably
advise Georgeanne something as follows.
There is a possibility that she could defeat a petition to compel
arbitration under the FAA on the basis of the section 1 exclusion of
employment contracts. However, given the current state of the case law,
she will probably have to go all the way to the Supreme Court in order
to do that. She has a better chance, under present case law, of obtaining
a court order striking those portions of her agreement which purport to
modify the statutory limitations period or available remedies, and
possibly of avoiding arbitration on those grounds. She has other tenable
arguments that her arbitration agreement should not be enforced, or that
it should be modified in certain respects, based upon the employment
discrimination statutes or common law theories, but these arguments do
not yet have support in judicial opinions. In any event, resisting
arbitration on any of these grounds will likely be costly and onerous.
Alternatively, Georgeanne could proceed before the arbitrator
designated in the agreement and try to persuade him as to the invalidity
of the provisions on limitations or remedy. Yet, it is unlikely that the
arbitrator would have jurisdiction to consider those arguments, since his
authority is limited by the agreement. Finally, she could simply file a
charge with the EEOC and her state agency, and wait to see what
happens.

V. BEYOND DocTmNE (AND BEYOND GEORGEANNE)
Georgeanne's arbitration agreement is particularly egregious, and the
possibility that existing legal principles might nonetheless call for its
enforcement is particularly appalling. But less egregious agreements,
including many commonly used by employers, pose substantial policy
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questions which the courts so far seem willing to ignore. The motivation
for that judicial attitude is easy enough to understand.
It is tempting to view with favor any procedure which diverts
disputes away from the increasingly clogged dockets of the courts, and
for that matter from the overly backlogged EEOC. But it does seem odd
that we as a society should be willing, in the name of contract, to entrust
the implementation of public policy as important as that embodied in our
anti-discrimination laws to a procedure unilaterally promulgated by the
party whose conduct is sought to be regulated. It seems odder still that
we would allow the regulatee to designate the decision maker, or the
method by which that person is chosen, and permit that person to
conduct a hearing in a manner and pursuant to procedures which may or
may not be effective in achieving legislative policies; then, allow that
person's decision to be kept from public view, and in the end accord it
a degree of finality we are not willing to accord the decisions of our
designated public tribunals.
It is probable that most employers who seek to substitute arbitration
for litigation are not trying to obtain unfair advantage over their
employees. Rather, they are motivated by a desire to avoid the costs,
tribulations, and publicity of litigation, and what they see as the
unpredictability of jury verdicts. They may believe-and probably for
good reason-that an arbitrator is less likely than a jury to be swayed
by emotional'appeal, and less likely to award damages that employers
would view as excessive. They may also believe that these motivations
are not inconsistent with the best interests of their employees-indeed,
that an arbitration system will be of benefit to their employees as well.
Depending upon how the arbitration system is configured, the
employers may be right. The number of employees with viable statutory
claims who are able to retain competent lawyers to represent them in
litigation, is undoubtedly small compared with the total number of such
employees; many of whom would be well advised to forego litigation in
favor of a fairly constructed arbitration. Employees, no less than
employers, may well prefer the advantages which arbitration has to offer.
Indeed, an in-depth survey of worker attitudes conducted by Richard
Freeman & Joel Rogers found that while one-third of those who had
gone to court over workplace rights were "very satisfied" with the
outcome, and twenty-three percent were "somewhat satisfied," thirty-four
percent were either "not too satisfied" or "not satisfied at all," and fiftyfive percent of the employees surveyed said they would prefer an
alternative system to deal with disputes in which an elected committee
of employees and management would jointly choose an outside arbitrator
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to resolve the dispute.248 A follow-up survey showed employees
favorably disposed to using arbitration to resolve disputes in place of
court or agency resolution, but nearly all (ninety-five percent) said they
believed an arbitration system should be jointly administered by
employees and management, and more than three-fourths expressed the
opinion that it should be illegal for companies to make reliance on
arbitration a condition of employment.24 9
But, employees do not necessarily need to have pre-dispute
commitments for arbitration in order to obtain those advantages. Perhaps
there is some psychological value to the employee in having the security
of an arbitration system in place, and there may be some situations in
which an employer who would have been willing to commit to arbitration as a general matter will decline to arbitrate a particular dispute after
it arises, or decline to do so on terms as favorable as those which the
employer would have accepted in a pre-dispute agreement. This might be
the case, for example, if the employer believes that the employee's case
is so weak, or so lacking in the potential for substantial damages, that
there is no real risk of litigation to be avoided. But there is no reliable
evidence to suggest that employers would routinely decline offers to
arbitrate from employees with potentially litigable claims.
It is in this light that current doctrine must be evaluated and
alternatives appraised. To the extent that current doctrine permits an
employer, by means of an "agreement" exacted as a condition of
employment, to divert all statutory claims from a judicial forum to an
arbitration process which tends to favor the employer's interests, then I
suggest current doctrine is unacceptable. It is unacceptable as a matter of
individual fairness, and it is unacceptable (to the extent there is a
difference) as a matter of public policy. The question is what can and
should be done about it.
There appear to be two possibilities. One is to mold doctrine in the
direction of assuring greater fairness. There is room, within existing case
law, for such a molding-to a limited extent through the FAA and
applicable common law principles, to a greater extent through interpretation of the applicable substantive statute, perhaps on the basis of
administrative guidelines. Gilmer, with its emphasis upon the particular
circumstances of NYSE arbitration and the particular status of Gilmer
himself, need not be read to preclude such a development. And, of

248. See RICHARD FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WORKER REPRESENTATION & PARTICIPATION
SURVEY: SECOND REPORT OF FINDINGS 14 (1994).
249. See id. at 16.
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course, there is the potential for legislative reform. Several commentators,
recognizing the need for procedural protection, have advocated such an
approach" 5
The other possibility is to withhold enforcement from pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate statutory claims in the employment context, either
altogether or on the basis of a rule requiring that the agreement be
knowing and voluntary. Again, there is room for supportive doctrinal
development. A broad reading of the FAA section 1 exemption for
contracts of employment would go a long way in the directing of
withholding enforcement, though concededly not all the way unless it
were accompanied by an interpretation of the FAA that would preclude
enforcement under state law. Alternatively, the applicable substantive
statute could be interpreted-in the case of Title VII and the ADA
through reliance upon explicit legislative history-to preclude or
condition enforcement as a matter of federal policy. Again, Gilmer,
because of its particular facts, does not necessarily stand in the way.
There are powerful arguments in favor of preclusion as opposed to
amelioration. First, even if an employer does not seek to obtain any
special advantage from arbitration, it is likely to favor employer interests
somewhat more than employee interests. Problems of institutional bias
are likely to persist even in the face of standard procedures for arbitral
selection. The limitations on discovery associated with standard
arbitration statutes and rules are likely to operate more often to the
employer's advantage. The absence of class actions, to the extent that is
a feature of standard arbitration law, is a detriment primarily to plaintiffs
in certain types of proceedings. If lawyers for employers are any
indication, arbitrators are less likely than juries are to award large
amounts as damages, and to the extent that the process does tend to favor
employer interests, the traditional rule of non-reviewability of arbitration
awards also works to the employer's advantage.
Second, a regime of policing arbitration arrangements for fairness,
while by no means impossible, would pose certain jurisprudential and
practical problems. Ruling out limitations on statutory rights and
remedies would be easy enough, but adopting meaningful and enforce'able standards with respect to such matters as arbitral selection and
discovery is likely to prove awkward for courts without guidance through
legislation or administrative rule making. Although this may seem
250. See Samuel Estreicher, Statement to the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management
Rep.
Relations Panel on Private Dispute Resolution Alternatives (Sept. 29, 1994), in Daily Lab.
(BNA) No. 188, D-33 (Sept. 30, 1994); Gorman, supra note 237, at 680-81.
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awkward, the nature of the criteria that would have to be adopted, and
the scrutiny which the appropriate criteria would require, would likely
invite litigation over their application in a manner otherwise considered
antithetical to arbitration as an expeditious dispute resolution procedure.
In the end, it is inevitable that despite policing by the courts, substantial
problems of fairness and public policy would remain.
Finally, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's protests to the
contrary, there is unavoidable tension between private dispute resolution
procedures and public norms. Even if arbitration can be counted upon to
adequately implement the public goal of compensating individuals for
wrongs, a system which operates on the twin premises of privacy and
finality can hardly be expected to serve as a substitute for public
tribunals in achieving the goals of deterrence and the systematic
development of the law.
In addition, while arbitrators can issue orders in the nature of
equitable relief, they may not have the same authority to do so, and do
not have the same public responsibility as courts to reach beyond the
interests of the particular claimant so as to assure compliance with
statutory commands.
The reasons that the Supreme Court has asserted for rejecting these
concerns-that public norms may be equally compromised through
settlement and that the EEOC retains authority to litigate on its own
behalf 2 5-are not satisfying. Whatever the impact of settlement and
its arbitration counterpart-the enforcement of post-dispute agreements-have upon the integrity of public norms, it is minimal compared
to the impact likely to exist through the wholesale enforcement of predispute agreements which may affect hundreds of thousands of employees. Also, given the level of funding which exists and which is likely to
exist in the near future, the prospect of independent EEOC litigation to
any significant degree is far more theoretical than real.252
Between a rule withholding enforcement from pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate statutory claims in the employment context, and a rule
requiring that waiver of a judicial forum be knowing and voluntary, the
former is certainly capable of formulation and enforcement with greater
clarity. However, the latter may also be workable, either on an individual
251. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1991).
252. See EEOCLawyers FiledLessDuringFiscal1995, 151 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 409 (1996).

Between October 1, 1994 and September 30, 1995, the EEOC filed a total of 322 substantive
lawsuits, 191 under Title VII, 37 under the ADEA, 76 under the ADA, 1 under the Equal Pay Act,
and 15 under a combination of statutes. See id. Of the 322 lawsuits, 79 were class actions. See id.
The total figure represented a substantial drop from the 373 lawsuits filed the previous year. See id.
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or group basis. A rule requiring that waiver be knowing and voluntary
could be developed along the lines established by the Older Workers
Protection Act for waiver of rights under the ADEA: a writing "calculated to be understood," specifically referring to claims under identified
statutes, supported by consideration in addition to anything of value to
which the individual is already entitled, with opportunity to consult an
253
attorney and to withdraw from the waiver within a specified period.
The right to refuse should be made clear, perhaps by insisting upon use
of a form in which the employee may elect to participate or not to
participate in the arbitration program.2" Such a rule should also
incorporate an assurance against reprisals for refusing to sign, and
specifically prohibit insistence upon waiver as a condition of employment.
Alternatively, the voluntariness principle could be established and
implemented on a group basis, requiring that any arbitration program, to
be given effect, must be approved by a majority of employees who
would be covered, voting by secret ballot in an election conducted by a
federal or state agency. Such a regime would create an environment in
which an employer seeking approval for arbitration would have an
incentive to develop a program that a majority of its employees would
be likely to accept. It would enable the employees to band together in
consultation with one another, and perhaps with the employer, over the
details of an acceptable program. Approval, once given, could remain in
effect for a specified period, or from period to period thereafter, subject
to a procedure that would enable dissatisfied employees to call for a new
election.
At least two arguments might be asserted against the majority rule
alternative. One is that it calls for, or at least contemplates the acceptance
of, negotiation between the employer and its employees over the contents
of the program. Under section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations
Act that might well constitute prohibited employer interference with or
2
domination of an employee organization. Amending section 8(a)(2)
has proved to be a sensitive political matter, but in this case unions
might find the existence of arbitration programs an attractive basis for
organizing, and be willing to accept at least a limited modification.
The other argument against the majority rule alternative is that it
carries with it the potential for conflict between individual interests and

253. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1)(A)-(F) (1994).

254. See id. § 626(f)(1)(H).
255. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
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group interests similar to that which the court in Alexander gave as a
reason for disassociating arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement from judicial remedies under Title VII" 6 Unlike the typical
union situation, however, the alternative under consideration could
require individual access to arbitration free of a group veto. That would
still leave the possibility, however, that a majority of workers, say
predominantly white, male and young, would be willing to accept an
arbitration program which is unsatisfactory from the perspective of those
workers most likely to need it. That possibility suggests that a requirement for majority approval should not entirely displace the rules designed
to assure the fairness of the procedures.
The reality is that an optimum solution to the problems posed will
require legislation. If it is believed that a system like arbitration is
preferable to the litigation of employment discrimination claims, then
such a system should be installed and regulated by law. Meanwhile,
however, there are principled alternatives to the regime of "anything
goes." Courts can and should read the FAA section 1 exclusion in
accordance with its original intent to encompass all employment
contracts, and leave the enforcement of arbitration provisions in such
contracts to state law. Courts can and should read at least the ADA and
Title VII to preclude enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements
in such a way as to deprive the employee of access to a judicial forum.
Courts can and should insist, on the basis of federal statutes, that an
arbitration agreement may not be used in such a way as to limit access
to a tribunal, to limit rights or remedies that would be available under
statute, or to deprive an employee of representation by counsel. Courts
can and should insist, as a matter of statutory and common law, that
arbitration programs imposed through adhesive contracts provide a
system of arbitral selection as free as possible from actual or apparent
bias, including institutional bias. Finally, Courts can and should insist, as
a matter of statutory and common law, that arbitration under such
contracts provide a scope of discovery appropriate to the issues being
litigated, that the right to class actions be maintained, that the arbitrator
render an opinion from which the arbitrator's reasoning can be determined, and that the award be subject to judicial review for substantial
errors of law.

256. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 & n.19 (1974).
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